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Freedom of Expression and Employment Security
in the Public Service: Different Rights
with Different Remedies
PATRICK D. HALLIGAN*
The goods that are pursued and loved for themselves are called
good by reference to a single form, while those which tend to
promote or to preserve these somehow or to prevent their contra-
ries are called so by reference to these, and in a secondary sense.
Clearly, then, goods must be spoken of in two ways, and some
must be good in themselves, the others by reason of these. Let us
separate, then, things good in themselves from things useful.
Aristotle, Eth. Nic., Ch. 6
If justice be totally independent of utility and be a standard per
se which the mind can recognize by simple introspection of itself,
it is hard to understand why that internal oracle is so ambiguous
and why so many things appear either just or unjust according to
the light in which they are regarded.
J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism
Ch. 5, On the Connection
between Justice and Utility
INTRODUCTION
Courts treat the first amendment rights of tenured and nonten-
ured public servants somewhat differently. The difference consists
of magnification of damages recoverable by tenured servants. The
amplifying device is the due process clause.' If a so-called tenured
public servant and a nontenured colleague both express protected
speech on the same topics in like circumstances and each is termi-
nated in retaliation without a hearing, the tenured servant who sues
may be able to prove noneconomic damages and receive a greater
compensatory award.2
* Senior Attorney, Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District; A.B., Stanford
University, 1965; J.D., University of Chicago, 1968; Member, Wisconsin and Illinois
Bars.
1. On the question whether discharge of a tenured public servant in retaliation for
speech justifies a greater award of damages than does retaliatory discharge of a nonten-
ured servant, see infra notes 67, 128-30, and 219-22.
2. See infra notes 67, 128-30, and 219-22. There is also some lingering authority
that even when the speech is not protected or the retaliatory motive is not a necessary
cause, the tenured servant may extend his right to employment and income by the time
required to adjudicate a claim of denial of free speech merely by making such a claim.
See infra notes 67 and 125-30. There may also be room for a tenured servant summarily
1
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The purposes of this Article are to juxtapose those differences in
treatment and to criticize the doctrine that produced it, that is,
deeming civil service employment as property protected by the due
process clause. To accomplish these objectives the Article will com-
pare various rights: free speech, liberty to seek employment, tenure
based on state law, and procedural due process.
Let us first take substantive rights, and of those, let us begin with
what one judge has called the first great division of public employee
discharge precedents: free speech cases.3
I. FREE SPEECH OF PUBLIC SERVANTS
A. Substantive Law
1. General Free Speech .- Defining and delimiting rights of ten-
ure and due process compel one first to ascertain the outlines of the
substantive law of the first amendment. The points discussed here
are the ones most likely to be articulated and thereby to influence
litigation over tenure and procedural due process.
Many cases concerning first amendment rights of teachers and
students have involved the out-of-class or off-campus activities and
associations of professors or teachers or older pupils and not their
performance or nonperformance of any assigned course, lesson, or
curriculum. 4 There is no United States Supreme Court decision
suggesting that there is "academic freedom" to deviate from official
curricula; the only mention of academic freedom in Supreme Court
precedents is discussion "in the large." 5 Many substantive ques-
tions remain unanswered. However, many rights of public servants
to express their views in and about the work place are by now well
established. But these are not rights properly classified as tenure.
Authorities steadfastly show that public servants have no more first
amendment rights than any other citizen, shibboleths about "aca-
demic freedom" or "tenure" to the contrary notwithstanding.
2. Criticism of Superiors.-Low level employees, at least, are
free to insult the employing agency and its high officials if the re-
buke touches upon public policy; but higher level employees or em-
dismissed to obtain damages for mental suffering or indignity notwithstanding lack of
merit in her claims of protected speech, retaliatory motive, and causation. See infra
notes 67, 77, 128-30, 154-55, 164 and 201.
3. In Yielding v. Crockett Indep. School Dist., 707 F.2d 196 (5th Cir. 1983), the
court speaks of "two great divisions," but proceeds to discuss three: free speech, sub-
stantive due process (or liberty to seek employment), and procedural due process in aid
of state law created property rights in continued employment and income. This paper
treats all three.
4. Tinker v. Des Moines Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Keyi-
shian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
5. Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359, 362 (1st Cir. 1969).
[Vol. 21
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FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
ployees whose work requires confidential communications and
intimate cooperation with the governing body and its high officials,
may be discharged for voicing public criticism in a strident tone.6
Private criticism of the policies of superiors by low level employees
is protected speech, even if abusive tones, if it is unbroadcasted, un-
published, and unaccompanied by obstruction, disobedience, or
nonperformance.7 But nonperformance and personal complaints
are not protected by the first amendment.
3. Nonperformance Is Not Protected.-If a bomb inspector in a
government munitions plant converts to a pacifist church or pacifist
political party (suggested, it makes no difference) can he decline to
inspect bombs for explosive readiness and insist he be reassigned to,
say, bird conservation work in the nearby park ahead of others on
the bird warden eligible list? The answer should be no. The ques-
tion most often arises not in ordnance plants but in schools and
state colleges, and the answer is the same.
In Palmer v. Board of Education,8 a probationary teacher con-
verted to the Jehovah's Witnesses and refused to teach certain exer-
cises and lessons on account of her new beliefs. For example, after
her conversion she believed that leading ethnic folk singing and
teaching biographies of great men (e.g., Lincoln, M.L. King) were
idolatry. She asked to be transferred from kindergarten to a third
grade class because in third grade there is less singing and celebrat-
ing and more reading. Plaintiff excelled at teaching reading. A
transfer, though inconvenient, was possible either in the same
school or to another of the 700 schools that the defendant board
operated. The defendants declined her transfer request and ordered
her to teach singing and biography. When she refused in writing,
defendants fired her without a prior hearing. Though fully certified
and regularly appointed as a full time teacher, plaintiff had served
only five of the six schools terms (3 years) of probationary service
required by the Illinois tenure law. Plaintiff grounded her claim of
a right to be retained in service and transferred, on the guarantees
of freedom of speech and of free exercise of religion. The district
court adjudged for defendants and found that the nonconformity of
plaintiff was not protected by the first amendment. The court of
appeals affirmed with the same rationale of nonprotection. The
Supreme Court denied certiorari. Like the Palmer court, others
6. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
7. Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
8. 603 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1026 (1980). See also
infra notes 207-17 discussing general free speech by instructors outside the classroom in
historical context.
1984]
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consistently have ruled that refusal to conform classroom teaching
content to the curriculum is not protected.
In Clark v. Holmes,9 the court affirmed a judgment for a defend-
ant college, which had hired a nontenured biology teacher and as-
signed him to teach a health course. The college department
prescribed the books and syllabus. The department chairman di-
rected the teacher to conform to them but he refused. He overem-
phasized sex and mental health and de-emphasized other parts of
the course. He also counseled students about sex and health and
declined to refer them to the college counseling service as ordered.
The district court entered judgment on a verdict for defendants.
The judge refused to instruct the jury that a college instructor had a
constitutional right to express himself as he wishes in his class. The
court of appeals stated that plaintiff had no right to deviate from
either the prescribed course content or from the time and the em-
phasis which the syllabus allocated to various parts of the course. 10
There existed on these facts no issue of first amendment rights upon
which the jury needed instruction.
A high school economics teacher in Ahern v. Board of Educa-
tion" departed from economics to discuss corporal punishment.
The principal told her to drop the topic. When she disobeyed, the
school fired her. She sued claiming "academic freedom" under the
first amendment. Lower courts rejected her claim. The appellate
court perceived her obstinacy as simple disobedience justifying
discharge. 12
In Adams v. Campbell County School District,13 the court re-
viewed trial court findings that high school English teachers' unau-
thorized inclusions of current events discussions in literature classes
justified nonrenewal of their contracts. The court expressed the
view that the principal can insist on orthodox methods and stan-
dard content. 14
On account of a reduction in force, a college in Hibbs v. Central
Community College'5 had to eliminate a language teacher. A com-
mittee was appointed to select the teacher that would be discharged.
The committee used as one criterion "tact in selection of curriculum
materials that are relevant to the teaching assignment.' 6 Plaintiff,
9. 474 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 972 (1973), cited with
approval in Connick v. Myers, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 1689 n.6 (1983).
10. 474 F.2d at 931.
11. 456 F.2d 399 (8th Cir. 1972).
12. Id. at 403-04.
13. 511 F.2d 1242, 1243 (10th Cir. 1975).
14. Id. at 1247.
15. 392 F. Supp. 1202 (N.D. Iowa 1975).
16. Id. at 1204.
[Vol. 21
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the discharged teacher, had developed a street language translation
exercise and had used it in class. The fact that it was not directly
contemplated by the course descriptions was a factor which moti-
vated the committee. The court entered judgment for defendant.
There is even authority that very vociferous public criticism of
the curriculum may be grounds for discharge of a teacher or an
administrator. 17 Cases in which absence of notice of the prohibition
was the basis of relief given to teachers accused of nonconformity
should be distinguished.18
Taken together, the cases recognize no distinction among levels
of instruction.' 9 While curricular nonconformity may produce
more harm with younger pupils, 20 curricular conformity is an ur-
gent matter in colleges as well.21 It is striking to note that few first
17. Schmidt v. Fremont Co. School Dist., 558 F.2d 982 (10th Cir. 1977); Kaprelian
v. Texas Woman's Univ., 509 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1975); Clark, 474 F.2d 928. But this
aspect of those three cases may be undercut by the Pickering, 391 U.S. 5631 (1968), and
Givhan, 439 U.S. 410 (1979), cases decided by the Supreme Court. However, the
Supreme Court precedents do not diminish the value of Kaprelian, Schmidt, Clark, and
cases cited in supra notes 9-16, for the proposition that nonperformance is not pro-
tected. See also infra notes 185-86.
18. These include Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (lst Cir. 1969), and Mailloux
v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387, aff'dper curiam, 448 F.2d 1242 (lst Cir. 1971), in which
high school English teachers discussed use of four-letter words as part of language
classes. But see Brubaker v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d 973 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 965 (1975), declaredfunctus officio, 527 F.2d 611 (1975), in which a panel of
the court found that the discharge without warning, of three eighth grade teachers
(plaintiffs) because they introduced a poem not directly relevant to their assigned
courses without prior approval by their superiors, did not violate the rights of the teach-
ers, given the nature and contexts of the poem. By an equally divided vote, the court,
sitting en bane but without the visiting judge who had written the panel opinion, af-
firmed the summary judgment for defendants of District Judge Bauer. See also Parker
v. Board of Educ., 237 F. Supp. 222, affd, 348 F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1965)), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 1030 (1966), where all three courts in effect sustained discharge of a probation-
ary teacher without warning or opportunity to cure his fault, solely for introducing as
assigned reading a book not forbidden by the school board but later found objectionable
by it.
19. Senior college settings: Clark, 474 F.2d 928, Kaprelian, 509 F.2d 133; junior
college setting: Hibbs, 392 F. Supp. 1202; senior high school settings: Ahern, 456 F.2d
399, Adams, 511 F.2d 1242, Keefe, 418 F.2d 359, Mailloux, 323 F. Supp. 1387, Parker,
237 F. Supp. 222, Schmidt, 558 F.2d 982; junior high school setting: Brubaker, 502
F.2d 973; elementary setting: Palmer, 603 F.2d 1271.
20. In Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1045, 1053
(1968), the editors of that journal state:
The assumptions of the "free market place of ideas" on which freedom of
speech rests do not apply to school aged children, especially in the classroom
where the word of the teacher may carry great authority. It seems unwise to
assume as a matter of constitutional doctrine that school children possess suf-
ficient sophistication or experience to distinguish "truth" from "falsity." Fur-
thermore, since one function of elementary and even secondary education is
indoctrinative-to transmit to succeeding generations the body of knowledge
and set of values shared by members of the community-some measure of
public regulation of classroom speech is inherent in the very provision of pub-
lic education.
21. In Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. at 1392, the court noted the following as-
1984]
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amendment cases arise concerning senior research faculty.22
4. Unprotected Personal Complaints.-In Pickering23 and Giv-
han24 the subjects that stimulated the mordacious public servants
were topics of public concern, viz. funding of the academic program
and integration of the races. But in the recent case of Connick v.
Myers,25 personal aspirations and grievances, about work site and
the character of assigned tasks, predominated and led to a refusal to
perform. 26 However, the case stands for more than the proposition
that nonperformance is unprotected. The court held that circula-
tion of a questionnaire was not protected when it sought mostly to
uncover inefficiency or incompetence of managers in dealing with
staff rather than in achieving or failing to achieve the public mission
of the office.27 The rationale was that personal interest or concern
dominated and public interest in the quarrel was minimal.28 The
pects of public high schools. They are community institutions; operate in loco parentis;
possess no tradition of faculty discretion or independence; are composed of immature
pupils; employ many immature teachers; are designed to concentrate on basics; are ex-
pected to indoctrinate the younger generation in community mores; and are expected by
parents to use established methods. The ruling was affirmed on appeal, 448 F.2d 1242
(1st Cir. 1971). Submitted, that the same characteristics describe undergraduate in-
struction, especially during the first two years. Indeed, immaturity of instructors may
describe college undergraduate teaching staffs at large state colleges better than faculties
of public high schools. Leaving it to empirical investigators to ascertain, the author
would not be surprised to find an average age of teaching assistants, assistant instruc-
tors, and nontenured assistant professors of state colleges substantially lower than the
average age of public high school teachers, and would not even be surprised to find little
difference in average educational attainment in the two populations. As to the imma-
turity and impressionability of undergraduate college pupils, especially in the first two
years, the academic profession itself recognizes the fact and recognizes as well that the
implication is a need for restraint of free expression by college instructors of undergrad-
uates. R. HOFSTADTER & V. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREE-
DOM IN THE UNITED STATES 410-11 (1955) [hereinafter cited as HOFSTADTER &
METZGER].
22. Part of the explanation is that the faculty teaching post graduates are doing
substantial research and are often tenured by contract or rule and enjoy both contrac-
tual substantive rights (which sometimes exceed constitutional minimums) and extra-
judicial procedural rights established by the contract or rule so they need not go to
court. Some of the explanation might also be that fewer of them are, to use the adjective
of Judge Wyzanski, "immature" teachers, Mailloux, 323 F. Supp. at 1392. It may also
be that older professors tend to be more conventional, or it may be that older academ-
ics, on average, express unconventional views in a mature style that generates, for any
given amount of doctrinal or ethical controversy, relatively less personal animosity than
do styles prevalent among younger scholars.
23. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
24. 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
25. 103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983).
26. Plaintiff, an assistant prosecutor, complained about reassignment to a branch
office and refused to accept the reassignment, among other things. Id. at 1684.
27. Id. at 1688-89, 1693-94.
28. Id. As to these personal questions, the court did not balance interests. It de-
clared them unprotected. There was no need to balance interests to ascertain if suppres-
sion was justified.
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questionnaire did ask one question of public interest, namely, one
about pressure at the agency to work for political candidates. The
court excised that for separate analysis, applied the test of Picker-
ing29 regarding confidential relations, and justified the discharge of
plaintiff, assuming that displeasure with the public interest question
was one motive of defendant.30 Unlike the other questions, the one
about political pressure was held to have protected status. 31 But the
interests of the employer were great enough to outweigh the interest
in freedom to ask it.32 The other questions plaintiff asked were not
balanced or weighed at all. They were brushed aside as
unprotected.
5. Legislative Power to Abolish Programs and Subsidies.-While
servants are sometimes tenured, programs are not. Servants are
obliged to implement the program of the employing agency but
have no legally protected interest in its continuation. The contrary
view erroneously equates abolition of a service with partisan substi-
tution of servants performing it and implies that once established, a
program can never be discontinued. Such a rule would mean there
could never be a change in the allocation of public resources or in
public policy and values. Public programs could only grow, never
shrink.
Teachers generally have little discretion and very few of them for-
mulate curricula or other policy. 33 Rather, they must conform to
plans and programs as legislated. Individual teachers and other ser-
vants have no special standing to challenge programs. 34 But others,
like pupils and parents, have attacked curricula in both their man-
dating and exclusionary aspects though with a striking lack of suc-
cess. 35 All in all, the power of legislatures to designate curricula is
29. Id. at 1691-92.
30. Id. at 1693. Allocation of the burden of proof of the consequences of motives
(causal element) followed Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429
U.S. 274 (1977).
31. Id. at 1691-93. At that point, the court hearkens to patronage cases beginning
with Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), see infra note 56.
32. Id. at 1694. The Court uses the balancing of factors given in Pickering, 391
U.S. 563, but weighs the interests of the agency more heavily than did the Pickering
Court.
33. Halligan, The Function of Schools, The Status of Teachers, and the Claims of
Handicapped: An Inquiry Into Special Education Malpractice, 45 Mo. L. REv. 667,
675-78 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Halligan]. But see Cathcart v. Anderson, 85 Wash.
2d 102, 530 P.2d 313 (1975), in which a law faculty with delegated curricular power
unsuccessfully attempted to deny its curricular perogatives and thus also the necessity
for a public meeting to exercise them.
34. The exception was Mrs. Epperson when her employing board instructed her to
use books which contained lessons the teaching of which was defined as a crime by the
state legislature. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
35. Halligan, supra note 33, at 674-75 nn.21-27, 678-79 nn.40-49, cf. Note, Chal-
1984]
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nearly "unquestioned. ' 36 The only strong limit on that the power
placed by the first amendment derives not from the free speech and
free exercise clauses but from the establishment clause.37
To limit legislative power to define, establish, and abolish curric-
ula and other programs would be to deny the appropriation powers
of legislatures, 38 the budgetary powers of executive authorities, and
the general policy making power of representative government. To
the criticism that the popular authorities should not legislate doc-
trine, the positive answer is that values are all there are to legislate.
There are some state constitutional impediments to legislative
disestablishment of schools or programs; they do not derive from
clauses guaranteeing free speech but from separation of powers
clauses and from the constitutional status and early history of state
lenging Ideological Exclusion of Curriculum Material: Rights of Students and Parents,
14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 485 (1979).
An attack on curricula and the culture they embody, poorly disguised as an attack on
intelligence tests, failed in Parents in Action on Special Educ. v. Hannon, 506 F. Supp.
831 (N.D. Ill. E.D. 1980); contra, Larry P. v. Riles, 495 F. Supp. 926 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
36. Epperson, 393 U.S. 97. See also infra notes 51, 52, 84, 185 and 186.
37. In Epperson, 393 U.S. 97, plaintiff did not claim an individual privilege of non-
conformity to the curriculum on account of dissent by her but instead attacked a curric-
ulum statute itself. No issue of disobedience to superiors existed. Indeed, in Epperson,
the biology books designated by the school board for use by Ms. Epperson contained a
chapter violative of the statute in question. To avoid the conflict between statute and
prescribed books, Ms. Epperson sought to have the misdemeanor criminal law in ques-
tion declared unconstitutional. The rationale is an unconstitutional attempt by the leg-
islature to establish one religious view. The Court presents the legislative and political
history showing an intent to establish one religious viewpoint. Id. at 107-09 nn.15-17.
The state apparently agreed in its brief that the legislature had such motives. Id. at 109
n. 18. In fact, the record showed that the state had not even once attempted to enforce
the act and likely never would. Justice Black doubted existence of a real controversy
justiciable by the Court and referred to the state's defense as apologetic, 393 U.S. at 109
(Black, J., concurring).
In another concurring opinion Justice Harlan accurately states the rationale of his
brothers as not free speech of the teacher but unlawful establishmentarian intent of the
legislature:
I concur in so much of the Court's opinion as holds that the Arkansas statute
constitutes an "establishment of religion" forbidden to the States by the Four-
teenth Amendment. I do not understand, however, why the Court finds it
necessary to explore at length appellants' contentions that the statute is un-
constitutionally vague and that it interferes with free speech, only to conclude
that these issues need not be decided in this case. In the process of not decid-
ing them, the Court obscures its otherwise straightforward holding, and opens
its opinion to possible implications from which I am constrained to disassoci-
ate myself.
Id. at 115-16.
In the next to last paragraph of the opinion the Court itself demonstrates that Justice
Harlan is correct when he says that the only rationale is the establishment clause. It
notes the clear intent of the 1928 legislature to establish one well defined, sectarian
religious viewpoint (biblical fundamentalism) and to disestablish others. Id. at 109.
38. University of Minnesota v. Chase, 175 Minn. 259, 268, 220 N.W. 951, 957
(1928).
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universities and their schools of agriculture and the like. 39 They
give public servants no special standing to challenge alteration or
elimination of a program.
6. Balancing Protected Speech Against Other Interests.-Even
when a court concludes that speech is protected and that alleged
consequences reflect interests protected by the first amendment and
finds intent, causation, and other necessary elements, it may not
adjudge for plaintiff unless it also finds that the protected speech is
more important than the purposes of the agency in suppressing it.4 °
Pickering41 is the leading case in which freedom of speech 42 is bal-
anced against the purposes of public employers. Its most recent
progeny is Connick v. Myers.43
Where and when should balancing be done? Under current law,
in the case of a tenured employee, the agency often will first have to
prove its asserted justification in a prior hearing by a nonjudicial
trier. It seems equally clear that when the employee is a servant at
will or a probationer, the employer may prove asserted justification
later.44 The reasoning is the same as with other issues of cause or
39. 14 C.J.S. Colleges § 2 (1939); Heimberger v. Board of Curators, 268 Mo. 598,
188 S.W. 128 (1916); Chase, 175 Minn. 259, 220 N.W.951.
40. Finding that the speech is protected has been called a preliminary "litmus"
test; but that is only the beginning of the scrutiny. Water v. Chaffin, 684 F.2d 833, 838
n.1 1 (11th Cir. 1982). The court notes the tendency of many courts to stop with the
"litmus" test. This Article argues for content based balancing. See infra notes 50-57
and 185-86. The court in Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429
U.S. 274 (1977), says the interests must be balanced. The intent of the language is to
create a defense of justification and not to define interests protected. See infra note 42.
Before a court reaches affirmative defenses of justification it must deliberate on the
elements of the claim of plaintiff. The court defines several elements in a first amend-
ment case brought by a dismissed public servant. One is specific intent of defendant to
retaliate. Another is direct causal connection between motive and result. Mt. Healthy,
429 U.S. at 284-87. Cases applying Mt. Healthy are cited infra note 60.
41. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
42. Balancing free speech against other interests should not be confused with the
process of balancing accuracy, speed, and convenient location of fact finding with other
good things. The latter is a principal subject of this paper. See infra notes 131-70. The
former is not a principal subject here.
43. 103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983). The allocation of burdens of proof in Connick follows
Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. 274. A well written case which reviews precedents since Picker-
ing, 391 U.S. 563, and applies Mt. Healthy, is Judge Mikva's opinion in Tygrett v.
Barry, 627 F.2d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Tygrett separates tenure and freedom of speech.
Id. at 1282-83. The due process clause is not mentioned and correctly not. The state of
the record in Tygrett made it unnecessary to opine much about allocation of the burden
of proof of causation. See infra notes 58 and 60. The Tygrett opinion allocates the
burden of proving countervailing interests to defendant. Id. at 1286. Thus, public pur-
pose is an affirmative defense of justification for suppressing in some circumstances, and
for some reasons, speech which is protected by the amendment.
44. Of course, belated articulation of a justification is some evidence of insincerity
of its assertion. But that is an evidentiary point or point of credibility and not a point of
due process and prior hearing. Tygrett, 627 F.2d at 1287-89.
1984]
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reason for discharge.45 That is, the time and place to try a claim by
the employer of justification by necessity is determined in part by
the status of the employee under local law.
The calculus of balancing interests is not as well developed by
recent decisions for first amendment cases as for due process
cases.46 The recent cases tend not to weigh the interest of the ser-
vant by very continuous, precise scales.47 Nor is there much finer
measuring of governmental interests. 48 The famous opinion of
Learned Hand in United States v. Dennis49 is authority for graded
measuring of both governmental and private interests. Let us first
look more closely at interests of plaintiffgservants.
One might say that a person's job is always a very important in-
terest of his. And at first blush this seems correct. But further con-
sideration makes one pause because the implication is that to
constitute a defense of justification, the rationale for restriction of
free speech of public servants must be as great for any one servant
as for any other. This somehow contradicts the very notion of bal-
ancing of interests. Perhaps the law should distinguish between
one's career in life and one's immediate employment, or even be-
tween good jobs and poor ones. Then again, this would tend to-
ward the worst sort of elitism by suggesting that an agency may
restrain speech of menial servants more than that of professional
servants. But finer grading of plaintiff's interests might be intro-
duced another way without such tendencies. For example, different
personnel actions could be justified by different levels of govern-
mental concern. The cases have not explored these possibilities.
As a hypothetical example, take a school system which transfers
an outspoken teacher from one neighborhood school to another be-
cause his political opinions are less inflammatory in the latter neigh-
borhood, but does not, however, change his pay, seniority, hours,
major duties, or the like. If the teacher finds the second assignment
onerous (perhaps a much longer distance from his home or in an
older schoolhouse) and sues, should the school board be able to
45. See infra notes 154-228 discussing the time of hearing which the due process
clause requires.
46. Compare infra notes 131-45 and 162-70 with supra notes 40-52 and infra note
184.
47. There is nothing like the exquisite distinctions between disability benefits and
other forms of welfare found in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344-45 (1976). In
United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), Judge
Hand contemplates a continuum of speech from unprotected to vigourously protected
and not merely a dichotomy between protected and unprotected speech. As to different
consequences from or means of suppression, see infra note 184 and accompanying text.
48. But in Connick v. Myers, 103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983) and Bush v. Lucas, 103 S. Ct.
2404 (1983), there was both more attention to and more sympathy with the interests of
the governmental agencies and their managers.
49. 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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make a defense of justification with facts less strong than if it had
fired the teacher? Suggested: less justification should suffice. This
brings us back to the governmental interests.
Governmental interests are also in need of more refined and
forthright measurement. Elsewhere50 this Article notes instances of
judicially approved, selective subsidization of political organizations
and of partisan opinions on burning moral issues. Taken together
with the cases upholding culturally loaded curricula and research
programs 5' and with the notable reluctance of courts to review 52
just those areas of executive discretion that reflect the most dra-
matic choices among values, those cases imply that the stronger the
sentiment of the government or the electorate of a jurisdiction, the
greater the privilege to disfavor dissent by public servants. The per-
ceived significance of a policy, qua policy, is a part of the govern-
mental defendant's interest to be weighed. Yet more authority for
this view lies in decisions in which courts, perhaps ironically, have
found it easiest to excuse suppression of speech of servants not on
mild disputes but on the most partisan of issues. We turn now to
those cases.
7. Partisan Activity and Affiliations of Public Servants.-Having
balanced the interests, the Supreme Court in 1973 decided in United
States Civil Service Commission v. National Association of Letter
Carriers53 and Broadrick v. Oklahoma54 that both the federal gov-
ernment and the states may forbid "partisan" activity by public ser-
vants. Partisan activity was broadly defined in the two cases, and
the statutes in question drew no distinction between probationers
and others.
While every state55 has a "little Hatch Act," municipalities rarely
do. Rather than prohibition, one sometimes still finds compulsion.
But the Supreme Court has ruled 56 that patronage dismissal even of
a temporary or probationary low level public servant is illegal be-
cause it violates the first amendment. But purely personal affilia-
50. See infra note 185.
51. See supra notes 33-38 and infra notes 84, 185 and 186.
52. Foreign relations and prosecutorial discretion, for example, are saturated with
value judgment yet nearly impenetrable to judicial review. Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 432 (1964); Halligan, A Political Economy of Prosecutorial
Discretion, 5 AM. J. OF CRIM. LAW 2, 4-6 (1977).
53. 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
54. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
55. See id. at 604 n.2.
56. The leading case is Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976). The Supreme Court
summarizes its own decisions in patronage cases since Elrod in Connick v. Myers, 103
S. Ct. 1684 (1983).
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tions, as distinguished from party affiliations, are not protected. 57
B. Procedure in Free Speech Cases
1. Mixed Motives and Burdens of Proof.-In Mt. Healthy City
School District Board of Education v. Doyle,58 the Supreme Court
defined specific intent to retaliate and some causal connection be-
tween retaliatory motive and result as elements a dismissed public
servant must prove in a first amendment case. But it allowed the
defendant to defend affirmatively by proving that the permissible
motives alone would have produced the same action.59 The lower
courts have applied Mt. Healthy's rules for allocating the burden of
proof of causation to cases of outspoken educators and peace of-
ficers60 and to at least one patronage firing case.61 Though none of
the cases use the specific terms, the rule that emerges is that plain-
tiff must prove that wrong motives contributed to the personnel ac-
tion but need prove neither necessity nor sufficiency of the motive
as a cause. Defendant is then free to defend by proving that other
motives were sufficient psychological causes, i.e., that retaliation for
dissenting speech was not a necessary psychological cause of the
adverse action by the superior.
2. Damages.-The damages courts will allow under a form of
action reflect the interests protected by that form. This Article else-
where explores interests protected by the first amendment for other
purposes. 62 It generally concludes that loss of wage income is a
consequential harm63 flowing from denial of free speech. We argue
that the magnitude of the consequence ought to influence the extent
both of the substantive right 64 and the procedural safeguards of it.65
But here for a moment we rigorously maintain the dichotomy be-
tween violation of right and consequence.
The consequential economic loss suffered by a discharged ten-
ured servant is arguably larger than that of a discharged proba-
57. Burris v. Willis Indep. School Dist., 713 F.2d 1087, 1094-95 (5th Cir. 1983).
See also Yielding v. Crockett Indep. School Dist., 707 F.2d 196, 199 (5th Cir. 1983).
58. 429 U.S. 274 (1977). The causal analysis in due process cases is not dissimilar.
See infra notes 128-29.
59. Id. at 287.
60. Tygrett v. Barry, 627 F.2d 1279, 1285-86 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (police candidate);
Yielding v. Crockett Indep. School Dist., 707 F.2d 196, 200 (5th Cir. 1983) (school
principal).
61. Nekolny v. Painter, 653 F.2d 1164, 1167 (7th Cir. 1981).
62. See supra notes 40-52, and infra notes 171-218.
63. See infra notes 178-202.
64. See supra notes 40-52.
65. See infra notes 107-13 and 131-45.
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tioner. The reason suggested, 66 by one judge, is that the monetary
measure of a secure living of a tenured servant, long into the future,
discounted for risk and time value of money, is larger than the mon-
etary expectations of a probationer evaluated the same way. Per-
haps this is no different than saying that a tortfeasor who destroys
the premises of a going business or the health of an established pro-
fessional woman, incurs more liability than one who harms a new
concern or an unfortunate person with few prospects. Viewed that
way, the discrepancies in damage awards are incidents of due pro-
cess cases67 which derive from differences in risk, security, and
nearness to property of income expectation and not a flaw in first
amendment doctrine.
3. Standard of Review.-In public employee discharge cases
grounded on the first amendment, reviewing courts are justified68 in
reviewing records plenarily, or even ab initio, because issues of law
and policy will predominate and balancing interests will be neces-
sary. Detailed trial court findings are always to be encouraged, but
their want should not inhibit outright resolution by reviewing
courts. 69 Now we can take up another substantive right of public
servants.
II. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND PURSUIT OF
EMPLOYMENT
A. Elements
The fourteenth amendment protects against governmental depri-
vation of the liberty to seek employment. To allege deprivation of
the liberty without due process of law, a servant must plead an un-
66. Vail v. Board of Educ., 706 F.2d 1435, 1451 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., dissent-
ing), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court, 104 S. Ct. 2144 (1984).
67. See infra notes 76-113 and 125-30. The same would be true of discrepancies
among judgments finding no retaliation and lawful cause for discharge but awarding
damages (for wages lost during the time between discharge and the probably later date
of termination had a hearing been conducted) to tenured servants while awarding none
to probationers.
Thurston v. Dekle, 531 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1976), vacated on other grounds, 438 U.S.
901, reinstated in rel. part, 578 F.2d 1167 (5th Cir. 1978), cited on this point in
Hardiman v. Jefferson Co. Bd. of Educ., 709 F.2d 635, 637-38 (11th Cir. 1983). We
suggest, however, that the Supreme Court cut the ground from beneath Thurston in
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978), discussed infra at notes 128 and 129. For more
discussion of the constitutional ramifications of suspension without pay pending hear-
ing, see supra note 2 and infra notes 77, 130, 154-55, 164 and 201.
68. Even findings of subjective intent are reviewable ab initio in some first amend-
ment cases. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964); Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union, 104 S. Ct. 1949, 1959 (1984). Plenary review of public employee
first amendment judgments also appears to be the rule. Yielding v. Crockett Indep.
School Dist., 707 F.2d 196, 198-99 (5th Cir. 1983).
69. Yielding, 707 F.2d at 198-99.
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true, derogatory statement by defendants70 and must prove a publi-
cation outside the agency which has seriously stigmatized the
plaintiff in the community. 7' But besides the elements of defama-
tion, plaintiff must prove coincident discharge.72 The rationale is
that the interest protected is the liberty to seek other employment
and neither the position plaintiff held nor reputation per se.73 Ab-
sent local tenure guarantees, a local government can dismiss a ser-
vant of whom it has a low opinion but may not broadcast its
opinion gratuitiously.
B. Damages for Violation of the Right to Seek Employment
Once the defendant provides a hearing, the harm abates. This
should be clear enough when the trier presiding at the belated hear-
ing finds the contested statements true.74 There is even authority
that the damages for a constitutional violation abate when a hearing
is provided regardless of its outcome,75 though presumably without
prejudice to refile the case to seek common law remedies such as
compensatory damages for defamation. The Article will now dis-
cuss substantive rights of public servants grounded on state law,
70. Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (1977); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, reh. denied,
425 U.S. 985 (1976); Colaizzi v. Walker, 542 F.2d 969 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 960 (1977). Discharge without giving any reason is no cause for action. Boland v.
Blakey, 655 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1981). See also Finley v. Hampton, 473 F.2d 180
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (government may deny an application for a higher national security
clearance, which makes one eligible for more promotions and transfers to desirable posi-
tions, without giving reasons and without conducting a hearing to ascertain the trust-
worthiness of the applying public servant).
71. Besides the cases cited supra note 70, see Burris v. Willis Indep. School Dist.,
713 F.2d 1087, 1091-93 (5th Cir. 1983), and Hardiman v. Jefferson Co. Bd. of Educ.,
709 F.2d 635, 639 (11th Cir. 1983). But when the ground of right is the guarantee of
free speech rather than substantive due process, then intramural statements derogatory
of a public servant may be actionable if they cause true harm. Simpson v. Weeks, 570
F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 911 (1979); Bottcher v. Fla. Dept. of
Agriculture & Consumer Serv., 361 F. Supp. 1123 (N.D. Fla. 1973), aff'd, 503 F.2d
1401 (5th Cir. 1974), reh'g denied, 510 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1975). Bottcher dealt with
alleged retaliation by adverse written efficiency rating, against a servant who could be
called an environmental-safety whistle blower. The court said she was entitled to aprior
hearing. Query, why a prior hearing? The opinion does not do a good job of separating
free speech, substantive due process, and procedural due process. See infra notes 95 and
171-206.
72. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976); Hardiman v. Jefferson Co. Bd. of
Educ., 709 F.2d 635, 638-39 (11 th Cir. 1983); Buris v. Willis Indep. School Dist., 713
F.2d 1087, 1091-93 (5th Cir. 1983); Moore v. Otero, 557 F.2d 435, 437 (5th Cir. 1977).
But see Bottcher, 361 F. Supp. 1123, and Simpson, 570 F.2d 240, concerning derogatory
statements not coupled with dismissal where the ground of right asserted is free speech
rather than substantive due process.
73. Besides the cases cited in supra note 70, see Hardiman v. Jefferson Co., 709
F,2d at 638-39.
74. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978). See infra notes 128 and 129.
75. Wells v. Doland, 711 F.2d 670, 677 (5th Cir. 1983).
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specifically, a right to continuity of income and employment that
some but not all public servants enjoy.
III. SUBSTANTIVE COMPONENTS OF TENURE
A. Definitions and Sources of Confusion
Work, income, and status are the goods or benefits sought by
workers who are attracted by tenure policies. Principal among
these is income.7 6 Opportunities to be heard are not sought for
their own sake. A right to income, status, and work without inter-
ruption may exist by statute, rule, or express contract. Without
such an objective provenience, 77 no such right exists. To be distin-
guished are rights to be free from the effects of discrimination on
account of race, sex, religion, or opinion. When denial or termina-
tion of service is a consequence of bias, a victim often may allege
denial or loss of work as a compensable consequence of the wrong.
But the principal interests protected are freedom, dignity, and lib-
erty to seek and hold work generally. In contrast, the interest
called "tenure" deems a particular position or "job" and its status
and income as primary goods and rights. It is acquired by service
after appointment and not merely by residence or citizenship. Only
a few people possess such a right. When it exists at all, it exists by
virtue of an extraordinary ground. Its size, value, and quality are
determined by local law. It usually has two components, seniority
and dicipline.
B. Substantive Tenure
1. Seniority.-Seniority is the right to continued service and in-
come despite reduction in agency activity. 78 This is typically a rela-
tive contractual right of senior servants. 79  It is not usually
rationalized as a method of discipline. However, when strict senior-
76. Hardiman v. Jefferson Co., 709 F.2d 635, 638 n.2. See also supra notes 33-39.
77. Subjective expectations of plaintiff, however sincere, are not enough to state a
claim. Wells v. Doland, 711 F.2d at 675. See also supra notes 2 and 67, and infra notes
78-92, 119-24, and 201.
78. Less often, the word seniority refers to passage of cut-off dates for eligibility for
monetary and other benefits like greater paid vacation and vested pension rights. An
example pertinent to this Article is probationary periods in civil service systems. After
serving a set time, one obtains the benefit of greater employment security. Unless other-
wise indicated, when this Article speaks of seniority, the meaning intended is employ-
ment security. A good description of different notions of seniority and how they
combine or conflict with other objectives like qualification and merit is found in C.
RANDLE & M. WORTMAN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 484-519 (2d ed. 1962).
79. 81A C.J.S. States § 96 (1977). The right is one relative to other servants and is
defined by contract or rule. Usually it is a right vis a vis other workers in the same line
of work. But the contractually defined size and scope of seniority units and work classi-
fication may be narrow or wide and is influenced by technology, commonality of skills,
departmental organization, occupational licensing, and past practice. Company wide or
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ity systems are modified by quality or effeciency ratings, the distinc-
tion blurs.80 Pure seniority rights are rarely protected8 ' by
statutorily defined adversarial procedures because the disputes of
fact implicated in straight reductions in force are of a sort that do
not require trial. There can be complexities in crediting service or
in classifying employees.82 Some disputes about a reduction in force
might imply a need for a trial type hearing, but not many.83 Very
few plaintiffs have sued alleging that a layoff violating seniority or
other civil service rules was compounded by a motive of the public
employer to suppress speech, and in the few cases that have arisen
there has been no conflict with the power to abolish programs.84 As
agency wide seniority usually operates only for defining eligibility for monetary benefits
like amounts of paid vacation.
80. See Hibbs v. Central Community College, 392 F. Supp. 1201 (N.D. Iowa 1975),
for an example of a first amendment challenge to discharge of a teacher in a reduction
of force accomplished by overall ranking of teachers on several components including
seniority and compliance with designated curricula and instructions.
81. 81A C.J.S. States § 96 (1977); 55 C.J.S. Mandamus § 203 (1948). There is no
right to an adversarial pre-discharge hearing to resolve ambiguities in the definitions of
work units or to contest relative seniority of servants. Management inquiry and deci-
sion are adequate. But the courts are open to a petition to compel an agency to review
its records of service of several employees and to decide explicitly which employees
should be clustered for review of seniority and which ones are in fact senior. Tamimie
v. Glass, 15 Ill. App. 3d 1, 303 N.E.2d 17 (1973).
Of course, there can exist disputes about which agency of government has personnel
managerial authority and responsibility for economy and conformity to budgets and
appropriations. University of Minn. v. Chase, 175 Minn. 259, 220 N.W. 951 (1928).
82. See, e.g., Tamimie v. Glass, 15 Ill. App. 3d 1, 303 N.E.2d 17, which presents
the situation of a person who works in a small division of an agency, but has varied
skills; then the larger agency abolishes the small division and position. When positions
are rigorously departmentalized and seniority is also compartmentalized to parallel the
departments, then elimination of a program or service has immediate consequences for
specifically identified persons. When their work includes expression of opinion, depart-
mentalized servants may be inclined to claim violation of their individual rights of free
expression by a reduction in force. Such a proposition cannot stand. See supra notes
33-39.
83. When there is a dispute of fact, it is usually not one about credibility of wit-
nesses or about occurrence or not of discrete actions or episodes. See infra notes 131-
45.
84. In Castelaz v. Milwaukee, 94 Wis. 2d 513, 520-23, 289 N.W.2d 259, 262-63
(1980), a state supreme court affirmed a judgment for defendant in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983
suit that had, atypically, been filed in state court. The court ruled that the power of a
state or local government to abolish programs and to reduce the manpower or other
resources assigned to a program, is broad and nearly unreviewable. But in dicta it said
that a "sham" reduction in force, of one position only, could be actionable if motivated
by a desire to suppress free speech of the one person terminated. It also ruled that
plaintiff was entitled to a hearing prior to discharge as a matter of state law and did not
opine whether federal law required a prior hearing. Defendant actually conceded that
plaintiff was entitled not just to some trial of first amendment claims, as all would agree,
but to a pre-discharge trial, because it sought and obtained summary judgment on
grounds of failure to exhaust administrative remedies that existed. The program in
question was not abolished. Query, what should be the rule in the unlikely case where
defendant abolishes a whole program or reduces the level of some service because it
wants to layoff one or two servants uttering protected speech? See supra notes 33-39,
51, and 52 and infra notes 185 and 186. The author believes that judgment in such a
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to the due process clause, reductions in force have not in fact gener-
ated any major cases. One reason85 is that while not authorizing
hearings, public personnel laws typically provide substantive stan-
dards in fair detail and require survey, notification, informal oppor-
tunity for comment, and review by higher management, 86 and these
may satisfy concerned parties. They satisfy the due process
clause, 87 and the plaintiffs' civil rights bar apparently concedes that
they do. There is much greater interest in attacking substantive
seniority rights themselves as denials of equal protection of junior
servants who are members of racial minorities.88 As to due process,
the second, more controversial, and much more litigated compo-
nent of tenure is the disciplinary component.
2. Discipline.-The disciplinary component of tenure is the con-
ditional right to continued work and income, assuming there is
work available. The conditions are stated by local law. Usually the
conditions are stated negatively, e.g., continued service "absent
cause" for discharge.8 9 Cases emphasize the causes for discharge
and sometimes forget the substantive right. Calling tenure a right
not to be discharged summarily is not strictly erroneous but unfor-
tunately fails to identify the real interest protected. One well known
positive definition is the right of federal judges90 to hold office "dur-
ing good behavior." The varieties of conditions on tenure are many.
Some are extensive and harsh, some narrow and undemanding. 91
So long as the condition does not unfairly touch upon race, sex,
case should be for defendant because judicial intervention to tell political departments
what services and levels of service they must provide and finance by taxes and what
values they must subsidize, is a worse constitutional evil than unfair loss of a job by an
outspoken public servant. The only other case in point is Hibbs v. Central Community
College, 392 F. Supp. 1202 (N.D. Iowa 1975). But see generally Crenshaw v. United
States, 134 U.S. 99 (1890), cited in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), for a broad
view of the power of the government to abolish positions for any reason.
85. Another may be that when seniority systems exist at all in the public sector,
they tend to be straight seniority systems in agencies like public schools. Other laws,
like certification laws, practically dictate the seniority clusters or units, and issues of
fact are few and readily determined documentarily. Also, seniority and competency
may be well enough correlated not to generate many real conflicts even in straight sen-
iority systems.
86. 81A C.J.S. States § 96 (1977); 55 C.J.S. Mandamus § 203 (1948).
87. See infra notes 131-45.
88. Members of racial minorities argue that they should be clustered and as a
group placed ahead of senior caucasian servants when the employing agency had dis-
criminated against other members of their race in the past and delayed their entry into
the public service. The Sixth Circuit had accepted the argument, but the Supreme
Court rejected it in Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dept., 679 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1982), rev'd,
104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984). A related private sector case is W.R. Grace & Co. v. United
Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers, 103 S. Ct. 2177 (1983).
89. 63A AM. JUR. 2D Public Officers and Employees §§ 189-203 (1984).
90. Art. III, U.S. Const.
91. Lowe v. Board of Educ., 76 III. App. 3d 348, 395 N.E.2d 59 (1979).
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nationality, age, religion, or opinion, the local jurisdiction is free to
define the conditions of substantive tenure. There is no constitu-
tional doctrine that obliges governments to have tenure systems,
much less any doctrine that obliges them to define tenure liberally.
Like land law, substantive tenure law is local law, although the
effect of defenses created by state law has created some conflict
among circuits.92
3. Quantitative Variables Determining Constitutional Prop-
erty.-The strength of the interest of plaintiff is determined by the
value of the state created right owned by the plaintiff and the mag-
nitude of forfeiture the defendant agency attempts.
a. The Value of the Substantive Right.-The cases repudiate
constitutional easements in classrooms or other pulpit rights of ten-
ured servants. 93 Similarly, preferred working conditions are proba-
bly not protected 94 by the due process clause operating alone. 95
There is, however, dicta to suggest that nonmonetary entitlements
92. An example is statutes of frauds type defenses. The Fifth Circuit follows local
law. Burris v. Willis Indep. School Dist., 713 F.2d, 1087, 1090-91 (5th Cir. 1983). The
Seventh Circuit is not unqualified in its commitment to follow state statutes of frauds.
Vail v. Board of Educ., 706 F.2d 1435, 1440 (7th Cir. 1983), aff'd per curiam by an
equally divided court, 104 S. Ct. 2144 (1984).
93. See Hardiman v. Jefferson Co. Bd. of Educ., 709 F.2d 635, 638 n.2 (1 lth Cir.
1983).
94. Two recent Supreme Court cases began as objections to reassignment to unpre-
ferred duties and work sites but escalated into demotion in grade and dismissal. The
initial issues were completely lost in the litigation process in one case because the ser-
vant was dismissed completely and the Supreme Court ultimately found for the em-
ployer. Connick v. Myers, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 1694 (1983). In the other case, an
administrative tribunal restored a demoted plaintiff to his prior grade and awarded him
back pay but apparently did not adjust his duties and work station to his older ones
which he preferred. All three tiers of federal courts adjudged for the government when
plaintif sued in court for yet more relief. Bush v. Lucas, 103 S. Ct. 2404 (1983). The
ultimate rationale was congressional constriction of remedies afforded public servants
whose speech the government has penalized and also remedial jursidictional limitations.
But the lower courts had additionally found that transfer and demotion were not "con-
stitutional deprivations." Id. at 2408. If even such retaliations are not breaches of the
duty of tolerance created by the first amendment, then it is difficult to see how working
conditions, locations, and content can be "property" in the sense of the due process
clause. Contra is Adcock v. Board of Educ., 10 Cal. 3d 60, 513 P.2d 900 (1973), 109
Cal. Rptr. 676, which is a very early application of Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593
(1972), to lateral transfers. A key question is whether the public employer has truly
promised specific job content, working conditions, or work sites. It is suggested that
federal courts should also ask if the good in question is great enough to justify allocation
of constitutional attention and federal court resources to its enforcement. See infra note
99. Also relevant here is the concentration on monetary income in the federal cases,
infra notes 97-108, and the noncognizable nature of harm in the form of disappointing
changes in work content, see supra note 93 and infra note 184.
95. But working conditions are protected somewhat by the first amendment. They
need not be called "property" to be an instrument of retaliation for expression or the
subject of judicial remedy for retaliation when there is genuine consequential loss. Mc-
Gill v. Board of Educ., 602 F.2d 774, 780 (7th Cir. 1979); Simpson v. Weeks, 570 F.2d
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valued strongly enough by the source state itself to make decrees of
specific performance available in state court, would be deemed a
form of constitutional "property" actuating the due process clause
and federal remedies as well. 96 Income is the best recognized form
of property of a public servant, and there may be boundaries even to
that estate. There is authority that when the monetary value of the
expectation is small, it is not constitutionally protected property. 97
The Seventh Circuit has held, 98 with one judge dissenting,99 that
one year's salary under a short term contract is property. Another
recent case'0° illustrates the primacy of income by ruling that sus-
pension without hearing, but with pay, was at most a de minimis
trespass on the "property" of the tenured public servant suing,
while opining that lost pay of such a servant during a fixed period of
disciplinary suspension would be illegal if accomplished without
prior hearing. 10 When the subject of the litigation is suspension,
the discourse moves from right or duty to violation or breach.
b. The Magnitude of Forfeiture.-The Supreme Court, in Goss
v. Lopez,'0 2 ruled that free public school instruction guaranteed by
state statute for children between ages six and sixteen was constitu-
tional property protected by the due process clause; but the expul-
sion, in nearly summary form, but by a regularly appointed official
with local authority, for periods less than ten days did not violate
the clause. The Court reasoned that ten or fewer days was not a
sufficiently large forfeiture of the substantive right to be a constitu-
tional wrong. Soon afterwards the court vacated and remanded, for
reconsideration in light of Goss and other recent authorities, the
public sector employment case of Snead v. Department of Social
240, 242 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 911 (1979). See infra note 184 for fur-
ther brief comment.
96. See infra notes 229 and 230. But the converse is not true. Availability of the
remedy of specific performance in state court is not an attribute a substantive right must
have in order to constitute constitutional property. It is suggested, however, that as a
technique of good policymaking, judicial economy, and federalism, federal courts ought
to consider how state law evaluates a substantive right which is a creature of the state
before deciding to classify it as constitutional property and thereby make it a subject of
federal judicial intervention into state and local government personnel management.
97. See infra notes 93-101.
98. Vail v. Board of Educ., 706 F.2d 1435, aff'd per curiam by an equally divided
court, 104 S. Ct. 2144 (1984).
99. Vail, 706 F.2d at 1453-56 (Posner, J., dissenting)
100. Hardiman v. Jefferson Co. Bd. of Educ., 709 F.2d 635, 637-38, 637-38 n.1 (11th
Cir. 1983).
101. Id. But the case did not carefully distinguish fixed term disciplinary suspen-
sions from suspensions pending a hearing scheduled to ascertain cause vel non for final
dismissal. See infra notes 102-13.
102. 419 U.S. 565 (1975). But even for shorter suspensions a rudimentary form of
instantaneous hearing is required. Id. at 576-77, 581-85.
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Services.10 3 In Snead, a three judge court struck down a law that
included some safeguards but no right to a contested hearing and
further provided for long term involuntary leave without pay of
nonprobationary public servants, in a civil service system, who suf-
fered mental disease. In an ordinary disciplinary case decided sev-
eral years before Goss and never appealed, a district court had found
for a civil service employee suspended without pay for ninety days
with no provision for hearing either before or after the fact.'14
Distinguishable from the first set of suspension cases, are a sec-
ond group of decisions reviewing suspensions without pay in sys-
tems which provide for hearings ex post and the possibility of back
pay awards. In McIntyre v. New York Department of Corrections,10 5
the district court assumed that a thirty day suspension wihout pay
is a forfeiture grievous enough to require contested hearing on the
issue of cause in some state tribunal but reasoned that prompt hear-
ing ex post constituted due process. In Muscare v. Quinn, 0 6 the
Seventh Circuit expressly ruled that a twenty-nine day disciplinary
suspension without pay of a nonprobationary firefighter in a civil
service system was grievous and that hearing ex post was not ade-
quate due process, and it reversed the judgment for defendant. The
Supreme Court took briefs and heard argument but dismissed the
writ as improvidently granted.10 7 In such cases the question
whether the magnitude of forfeiture activates the due process clause
is masked somewhat by the question of the timing of safeguards
required by the clause.
Also to be distinguished are yet a third cluster of authorities in
which suspension without pay of a tenured public servant is ordered
pending a hearing to ascertain proper cause for complete dismissal.
In such cases the issue of proper timing of the proceeding is iso-
lated. The rule of Arnett v. Kennedy, 0 8 is that a hearing ex post
suffices as due process. The system, approved in Arnett, of dismis-
sal followed by later hearing by an impartial person with power to
reinstate, has the same effect as "suspension" without pay pending
hearing to ascertain cause for dismissal; at least one lower court has
so found. 10 9 Both Arnett and other cases, representative of the re-
103. 355 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), vacated and remanded in light of Arnett v.
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), aff'd, 389 F. Supp. 935 (1974), vacated and remanded as
moot, 421 U.S. 982 (1975).
104. Buggs v. Minneapolis, 358 F. Supp. 1340 (D. Minn. 1973).
105. 411 F. Supp. 1257 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
106. 520 F.2d 1212 (7th Cir. 1975)
107. 425 U.S. 560, reh'g denied, 426 U.S. 954 (1976).
108. 416 U.S. 134 (1974), discussed infra note 164 and accompanying text.
109. Smith v. Carey, 473 F. Supp. 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Contra: Thurston v.
Dekle, 531 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1976), vacated on other grounds, 438 U.S. 901 (1978),
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cent trend 110 to justify hearing after the fact, make it safe to predict
that both disciplinary suspension short of dismissal and suspension
pending dismissal hearing, will be validated so long as, afterwards,
there is provided some review or hearing by a person with power to
remedy ungrounded suspension. The reasons for confidence in pre-
dicting judgments on the issue of timing of a hearing are developed
below. Whether the Supreme Court will define some class of disci-
plinary suspensions without pay which an agency could impose
without any hearing before or after the fact, is harder to predict.
Whether the court should do so also begs some of the questions
we take up in the next several sections, viz. what are the costs and
benefits and how shall interests be balanced in due process employ-
ment cases? By way of preview, consider that no state is obliged to
create any civil service system. For that reason it is suggested that
the federal judiciary ought to concede to a state the power to have
limited civil service systems and to give its managers and depart-
ment heads summary power I I of suspension without pay for signif-
icant periods1 12 as a sort of third alternative between public service
at will and a full blown civil service apparatus. Limited constitu-
tional freedom summarily to demote would rest on similar argu-
ments. Demotions of public servants with tenure have not been
litigated too often, 113 but such cases are likely to follow patterns
arising in suits reviewing other sanctions short of dismissal.
C. Equal Protection and Tenure
In granting and denying tenure within personnel systems and in
reinstated in relevant part, 578 F.2d 1167 (1978); and dicta in Hardiman v. Jefferson
Co., 709 F.2d at 637-38 n.1.
110. See infra notes 164-68.
111. Its exercise, of course, should be amenable to challenge, on extraordinary
grounds, after the fact in courts of general jurisdiction. An example of an extraordinary
ground is racial bias or a motive to retaliate for protected speech uttered by the sus-
pended servant.
112. The author believes that courts should tolerate local rules and statutes which
give higher managers power to suspend for 200 work days without pay and without
having to prove cause in a state or local tribunal. Civil service employment on such
terms would still be more secure than the service at the will of employers of most of the
American labor force. Such tolerance would do a lot for federalism and for productiv-
ity in the public sector while still making it preferable to security conscious persons.
113. Demotions in grade producing reductions in pay are likely to be treated as
substantial trespasses on "property" of tenured servants if they are permanent and
large. The administrative tribunals seemingly had viewed things that way in Bush v.
Lucas, 103 S. Ct. 2404 (1983), but the lower courts had not. Id. at 2408. See infra note
151. Query: should reduction by two or three "steps within grade" producing less than
a 15% reduction in pay and likely to be recovered in three or four years, be deemed a
trespass large enough to require a state hearing and, in default of state hearing, federal
court trial? The author believes that some demotional acts of managers should be clas-
sified as constitutionally de minimis in the interests of federalism, judicial economy, and
good order in the segments of the public service with civil service systems.
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designing systems, officials must refrain from unlawful classifica-
tion and discrimination. That branch of public employment law is
beyond our agenda. The required level of justification for a system
that grants tenure in some agencies, departments, and position clas-
sifications, but not in others would depend on the identity of classes
of persons adversely affected and perhaps on other rights which
may be implicated. Tenure itself, however, is not a fundamental
federal right;" 4 it is not a federal right at all, but a locally created
right. In many cases, a state will be able to justify its classifications
by showing advancement of reasonable but noncompelling interests.
One challenge based on denial of equal protection to a system with
several "paths" to tenure was virtually brushed aside.' 15
This brings us to implied tenure.
D. Implied Tenure
1. Vague or Unrecorded Promises.-The Supreme Court
cases' 16 which initiated recognition of public employment security
as constitutional property, required a source in state law but did not
limit the sources and did not reason about state law substantive
conditions, defeasances, or bars to substantitive rights. We have al-
ready noted that a subjective expectation of the plaintiff servant is
not enough." 7 Generally courts look for a reasonably clear entitle-
ment. This is good policy and articulates well with prevailing no-
tions of public contracts. Here it is also relevant to mention oral
contracts because, while an oral promise can be express and unam-
biguous, as a practical matter vagueness and lack of a written mem-
orandum often go together.
The enforceability of oral contracts differs in the several states.
We have noted that federal courts who hear constitutional claims
usually, but not always," 8 follow state law and refuse to deem oral
promises unenforceable in state law, as sources of federal constitu-
tional property. Like requiring clear entitlements, requiring written
sources whenever state law does, is good policy and conforms to
familiar values in public contract law and public finance. The alter-
native amounts to judicial legislation of a federal statute of frauds
and comes close to creating substantive due process rights of public
employment security. That in turn violates the principle of federal-
ism. A particular form of asserted implied tenure should now be
114. See supra notes 76-113.
115. Wells v. Doland, 711 F.2d 670, 675 (5th Cir. 1983).
116. See infra note 125.
117. See supra notes 77-92.
118. See supra notes 92 and 97-99.
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explored because it illustrates both the interrelations and distinc-
tions between substantive rights and procedural protections.
Tenure systems often include special tribunals to hear objections
to disciplinary actions against nonprobationary servants. Occasion-
ally an agency creates a tribunal with greater or lesser power to
redress grievances of servants, whether tenured or not, or even in
the absence of any promise of tenure as such. An example is a com-
mittee at a state college that gives all faculty an opportunity to dis-
cuss implications for freedom of expression that personnel decisions
may or can have. Also, an agency sometimes promises disciplinary
interviews, warnings, or hearings without, in so many words, prom-
ising any continuation of service. Employees will argue1 19 that such
procedural rights for their own sake are nearly meaningless. There
is something to be said for the argument. But varied inferences are
possible. The question of substantive employment security implied
by procedural safeguards is a question of intent.
If an employing agency chooses to do so, it can give everybody a
little bit of tenure. Whether it has done so is a question of local law
and construction of local documents, promises, and regulations.
For example, a state college might promise not to discharge junior
faculty members, not tenured in the usual sense, for some few rea-
sons while retaining the privilege to discharge them for any other or
for no reason. Alternatively, the creation of panels to hear disputes
about certain reasons may not evidence an intent to promise any-
thing more about such reasons than public law provides anyway.
Indeed, such panels may limit rights, not enlarge them.
Consider, for example, a promise of a state college to junior
faculty not to take adverse personnel action on account of institu-
tional, factional, or decanal disagreement with the published opin-
ions of a faculty member and its creation of a panel to hear
grievances about alleged breaches of the promise. In a case so hy-
pothesized, the junior faculty member has not received a promise of
employment security or tenure in the usual sense. In such circum-
stances creation of the special panel does not create a new substan-
tive right because the right of a public employee to publish freely is
established with but few limitations by the constitution and by fed-
eral precedents and not by local mechanisms or rules. If one as-
sumes that the promises of fairness in matters of free expression
119. In Kurle v. Evangelical Hosp. Ass'n, 89 Ill. App. 3d 45, 411 N.E.2d 326
(1980), plaintiff argued that the state nursing act obliged private hospitals to retain
nurses absent objective cause or reduction in force. Plaintiff grounded her argument on
clauses in the act requiring employers of licensed nurses to establish channels of "pro-
fessional" communications for nurses to voice complaints to management and for man-
agement to admonish nurses. The court rejected the argument, in effect ruling that a
mandatory procedure does not imply a substantive right.
1984]
23
Halligan: Freedom of Expression and Employment Security in the Public Servi
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1984
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
made by the college do not exceed the obligations of the college that
the constitution requires in any event, 120 then the creation of panels
to hear grievances about the promises may be protective of the insti-
tution more than protective of the servant. The state in such a situ-
ation may be able to assert a defense of non-exhaustion of remedies
to a complaint1 21 which alleges trespass on first amendment rights
and does not allege prior recourse to the special panel or tribunal.
Creation of such panels is not likely to deprive courts of ultimate
power or jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes about free expression,
but local employment terms requiring that disputes of some types
be referred to special panels might be construed as covenants of em-
ployees not to sue until they have fulfilled a precondition of prior
recourse elsewhere. Closely viewed, protective terms of personnel
regulations and employment contracts may create no new substan-
tive rights but rather a limitation upon the enforcement of preexist-
ing substantive rights. This is especially likely in the case of
probationary employees. 122
In Bishop v. Wood,123 a city ordinance required the city manager
to warn police officers of deficiencies, to give "reasons" in writing
to an officer discharged, and to allow comment by the officer.
Plaintiff argued that the requirement that the manager notice "defi-
ciencies" and state "reasons" implied a substantive right to uninter-
rupted service and pay, absent deficiencies in fact, and implied that
the manager could not fire an officer unless there be objective rea-
sons. Construing local law to the contrary, all three federal courts
adjudged for the city which had refused to conduct a pre-termina-
tion hearing to determine existence or not of real deficiencies, but
all three courts agreed that the question was one of state law. One
court, in Edward v. Brown, 124 found an implication directly oppo-
site to that usually advanced by plaintiff employees. It ruled the
120. If a college promises to afford greater liberty of expression than the constitu-
tion obliges, then arguably the employee has an additional substantive right which
might be denominated as property; he might therefore in some circumstances enjoy the
guarantee of procedural due process that other promises of employment security
provide.
121. See infra notes 148-49.
122. For an example of such an outcome, see Koch v. Board of Trustes 39 Ill. App.
2d 51, 187 N.E.2d 340 (1962).
123. 426 U.S. 341 (1976). Apparently in accord are Swab v. Cedar Rapids Commu-
nity College School Dist., 494 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1974), and Hibbs v. Central Commu-
nity College, 392 F. Supp. 1202 (N.D. Iowa 1975), both cases concerning Iowa teachers.
Iowa has no express tenure guarantees but its statutes outline procedures that boards
must use to fire faculty. The courts did not reach or decide the implication issue in
Hibbs or Swab because the boards in question had complied with procedures.
124. 699 F.2d 1073 (11 th Cir. 1983). An ordinance provided procedural safeguards
to police officers and substantively promised them continued work during "good behav-
ior and efficient service to be judged by the commissioner." The court ruled that the
quoted words made the substantive promise illusory. Thus, dismissal of a police major
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substantive promise of job security to be ultimately illusory and, for
that reason, ruled that the promised procedural protections were
dispensable.
IV. THE PROCEDURAL GUARDIANS OF TENURE AND FREE
SPEECH
A. Allegations of Denial of Procedural Due Process of Law: The
Elements of Substantive Entitlement and Causation
If a discharged public servant without tenure as defined by local
statutes, alleges a denial of due process of law but does not allege
denial of some substantive civil right, then the charge is demurrable
because the due process clause by itself creates few substantive enti-
tlements. Rather it guarantees procedural protection of substantive
property or liberty rights created by other sources. For that reason,
the failure of a plaintiff to allege either a substantive right to em-
ployment or a discrimination in employment on forbidden grounds,
implies a failure as well to state a violation of the due process
clause. As the Supreme Court expressed it in Board of Regents v.
Roth: "Property interests, of course, are not created by the Consti-
tution. Rather they are created and their dimensions are defined by
existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent
source such as state law. .... ,,125 Another court put the point in a
nutshell: "the Fourteenth Amendment does not create a protected
interest." 126
For there to exist a duty to provide due process, there must be an
entitlement independent from the due process clause and worthy of
denomination as a "property" or "liberty" interest. One court re-
cently found that a short term expectation based on a verbal em-
ployment contract was protected "property" as much as long term
tenure based on written policies. The Supreme Court affirmed the
decision. 127
Approaching the same question as one of causation is Carey v.
by the Commissioner without hearing was justified. Id. at 1077. The opinion reversed a
judgment for the plaintiff officer.
125. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). The companion case is
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). Later it will be argued that the Supreme
Court should have found outright for defendants in both cases, that it should not have
recognized tenure as constitutional property, and that it should not have conflated the
first amendment and the due process clause. See infra notes 225-31 and accompanying
text.
126. Palmer v. Board of Educ., 603 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1026 (1980). See also Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793, 796-97 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1039 (1980).
127. Vail v. Board of Educ., 706 F.2d 1435 (7th Cir. 1983), aff'd per curiam by an
equally divided court, 104 S. Ct. 2144 (1984).
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Piphus,128 which teaches that even where an arguable substantive
right exists, failure to afford a procedure to ascertain it does not by
itself constitute a cause of action for monetary damages; pleading
and proof of actual individual loss proximately caused by violation
of the underlying substantive property or liberty right is necessary.
Failure to afford due process is not generally compensable without
proof that the missing due process would have secured for plaintiff
a real substantive benefit. t29 But in dicta, the Piphus court sug-
gested that mental discomposure caused by denial of due process
could be compensated even though the merits of the underlying dis-
pute were with the defendant.' 30 But assuming an allegation of
duty, damages, and causation, what allegation of breach will suf-
fice? Just what procedures are due to one with a substantive em-
ployment right? And when and where must they be afforded?
B. The Character of Procedures Due
Bureaucratic methods of personnel management and removal
will often withstand due process scrutiny. In nondisciplinary termi-
nations, nonadversarial factual investigation and review will likely
suffice, and many personnel management decisions effected without
an adversarial hearing will withstand challenge when the system is
systematic and consultative. In Mathews v. Eldridge,'3 1 plaintiff
sued the secretary of HEW to enjoin enforcement of regulations
governing the continuing payment of benefits to disabled persons.
The regulations implement 1956 statutory benefits payable to per-
sons unable "to engage in substantial gainful activity" on account of
"physical or mental impairment."'' 32 The regulations allowed state
agencies acting as delegates of HEW to review files and terminate
payments without a hearing. 33 A recipient may later request a
128. 435 U.S. 247 (1978). The opinion demonstrates the subtle interplay of the ele-
ments of duty, breach, damages, and causation in constitutional torts.
129. 435 U.S. at 255-56. See supra note 58 and accompanying text, concerning the
causal element in free speech cases.
130. Id. at 260-64. It is this possibility combined with the classification of civil ser-
vice guarantees as property for purposes of the due process clause that creates the dis-
parity in treatment of free speech of different classes of public servants. The tenured
servant may charge not only restriction of free speech but denial of due process and can
get added damages. More than that, notwithstanding Carey, 435 U.S. 247, in at least
two circuits, see supra note 67, a tenured servant who makes a weak or insincere first
amendment claim, arguably can collect damages on his due process count for defend-
ant's failure to provide prior or expedited hearing, even though later trial shows that a
hearing officer or other trier of fact would have brushed aside the charge. The disparity
seems wrong, and that in turn should make the courts rethink the doctrine that tenure
and civil service job security are constitutional "property." See supra notes 2, 67 and
77, and infra notes 154-55, 164 and 201.
131. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
132. Id. at 336.
133. The regulations create a system of monitoring by state agencies. The state
[Vol. 21
26
California Western Law Review, Vol. 21 [1984], No. 1, Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol21/iss1/3
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
hearing by a federal administrative law judge. The time elapsed
from a demand for a hearing and a written decision was typically
eleven months.1 34 Some 3.3% of benefit denials had been reversed
by the state review process. Administrative law judges had reversed
some 58.6% of denials sustained by the state agency.135
This particular case conformed to this pattern 136 but the particu-
lar consequences were extreme. Creditors foreclosed on the home
of plaintiff and repossessed his furniture so that plaintiff, his wife,
and their children had to sleep in one bed. 137 The opinion, how-
ever, emphasizes that the typical scenario is what is relevant to the
constitutional issues. The trial court had ruled that the Social Se-
curity Administration must afford an evidentiary hearing before
terminating benefits. The Court of Appeals had affirmed but the
United States Supreme Court reversed. 138
The rationale is a balancing of interests. The due process clause
is not a technical rule; it relates to time, place, and circumstance.13 9
With this proviso, the Court gives the usual rule: something less
than an evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse agency ac-
tion.1 40 The court identifies four factors which will sometimes dic-
tate a need for prior hearing: the private interest jeopardized, the
risk of erroneous deprivation in the existing procedures, improved
accuracy expected from substitute or added safeguards, and the
governmental interests injured or burdened by the substitute or ad-
ditional procedures.14'
As for risk of error, the Court reasons that the relevant inquiry is
medical and that the value of an evidentiary hearing to a deci-
sionmaker is not great when the issues are medical because hearings
are designed principally to determine issues of credibility. The
agency regularly inquires of recipients by mail or phone and requires proof of continu-
ing disability. Regulations impose a continuing burden on the recipient to prove disabil-
ity. The agency obtains data from providers of medical service as well as from a
questionnaire from the recipient to prove disability. A team of two persons reviews the
material. One is a physician; one is a layman. They determine the existence or non-
existence of continued disability without a hearing. The state notifies the recipient of
the decision. When it is adverse to a recipient, he may examine the file, submit more
data, and request reconsideration. But no adversary hearing occurs. The Social Secur-
ity Administration affords a hearing on demand but only after the recipient has re-
quested state agency reconsideration. The Social Security Administration terminates
benefits two months after the date which the state agency finds was the day the disabil-
ity ceased. It does not pay benefits pending hearing.
134. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 342.
135. Id. at 346.
136. Id. at 324-25.
137. Id. at 350 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 349.
139. Id. at 335.
140. Id. at 343.
141. Id. at 335.
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Court notes that the regulatory system allows the recipient to sup-
plement the file with added data or opinions and to request
reconsideration. 142
Against the probativeness of the system and unpromising likeli-
hood of large improvement by prior hearing, the opinion weighs the
governmental interest. It notes the complication and delay of prior
hearings and the large cost of hearings and of interim payments to
ineligible persons. It even notes the possibility that such costs
might result in budgetary action to reduce payments to eligible per-
sons. These facts outweigh the harm to erroneously terminated re-
cipients despite very harsh results in an occasional hard case. Rules
are to be shaped by the overall risk of error inherent in the general-
ity of cases and not by preoccupation with exceptional cases. Legis-
lators and administrators are free to select a procedure reasonably
appropriate to the type of decision to be made.143
The last part of the rationale is deference to legislative and ad-
ministrative balancing. In the absence of bad faith, the assessment
of the relevant factors by administrators is entitled to some weight.
The court assumes administrators acting in good faith will design
procedures to reduce error to a low level. 44 That affords due pro-
cess of law even though some errors unfortunately occur despite
good will and reasonable design.
One lower court 45 refined the Mathews principles by declaring
that the required degree of added procedural safeguards, if any, var-
ies directly with the importance of the private interest affected and
with the usefulness of the additional safeguards advanced and varies
inversely with the governmental burden and any other adverse con-
sequences of affording the added safeguards.
Query, under Mathews, could an agency which promises its ser-
vants continued employment on the condition of efficiency, devise a
system of efficiency rating computed by observations and measure-
ment by several persons expert in the area of performance and who
consult with one another over time, justify termination of a person
with several low ratings who had served long enough to obtain ten-
ure under local law? Suggested, such a procedure is lawful if it
gives the servant an opportunity to comment to the decisionmaker
on the ratings and if it possesses some safeguards against extreme
partiality of the observers. Ascertainment of efficiency is better
made by means other than a trial. What procedure is due to the
holder of a right depends upon local substantive law defining the
142. Id. at 346.
143. Id. at 345.
144. Id. at 349.
145. Coralluzzo v. New York Parole Bd., 420 F. Supp. 592, 597 (W.D.N.Y. 1976).
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right and substantive conditions. Yet assuming that an adversary
hearing be required, where and when should it be completed?
C. The Place to Proceed
In what local forum one may litigate is a question of the local law
of subject matter jurisdiction. The due process clause does not re-
quire a local jurisdiction to allocate disputes among its tribunals in
any particular way. The question of identity of the correct local
forum is not a federal constitutional question. When the employ-
ment is employment in the federal service, questions of allocation of
adjudicatory power become questions of federal constitutional sepa-
ration of powers but not questions of construction of the due pro-
cess clause. The due process clause regulates the procedure of
tribunals and the timeliness of their action but does not require
tribunals of one identity rather than another. 146
Absent a statute allocating the task elsewhere, the courts of gen-
eral jurisdiction hear employment disputes from the public sector.
However, most public employment tenure schemes create special
tribunals to hear disputes between nonprobationary employees and
the employing agency concerning cause and condition. A jurisdic-
tion may create several tribunals 147 to hear disputes about different
conditions or causes. Universities and schools sometimes create a
separate tribunal to hear disputes about alleged motives of superiors
to limit free expression.
The jurisdiction of federal courts over first amendment disputes
is concurrent. But the federal courts themselves will sometimes
close their doors to litigants who by-pass state tribunals. 148 When
there is a doubt about either their access to or the subject matter
jurisdiction of a special tribunal, nonprobationary employees are
well advised first to assert first amendment rights in administrative
tribunals, lest courts, especially federal courts, later entertain a de-
fense plea of prematurity, failure to exhaust administrative reme-
dies, 14 9 lack of standing, 50 or even resjudicata.'5 ' But when local
146. 16A Am. JUR. 2D Constitutional La", § 854 (1979); State ex. rel. Burchett v.
Taylor, 150 W. Va. 702, 149 S.E.2d 234 (1966). But a federal statute implementing the
fourteenth amendment and granting aid to the states may oblige the states to create new
tribunals. Turbedsky v. Commonwealth Dept. of Labor & Industry, 65 Pa. Commw.
363, 442 A. 2d 849 (1982); Helms v. McDaniel, 657 F.2d 800, (5th Cir.), reh'g denied,
664 F.2d 291 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 946 (1982).
147. Koch v. Board of Trustees, 39 Ill. App. 2d 51, 187 N.E.2d 340 (1962), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 989 (1964), mentions a number of tribunals or panels at the employing
agency, a university.
148. The developing view is that state remedies after the fact are all that is due. See
infra notes 153-57. This is a more fundamental limit than the defense of failure to
exhaust other remedies. See supra note 122 and infra note 149.
149. For a spirited dialogue about the nature of the exhaustion defense, its availabil-
ity in public employment cases, and its relation to the issue whether prior hearing is the
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law makes it very clear that no administrative tribunal has subject
matter jurisdiction to hear disputes about free speech or that proba-
tionary employees are denied access to such panels, then seeking
administrative relief would be a waste of time. Even if the parties
cooperate, the proceedings would be a nullity, because the parties
cannot confer subject matter or remedial jurisdiction upon a
tribunal. 15 2
When an administrative tribunal has jurisdiction to hear a dis-
pute about substantive rights of free speech and tenure and a ser-
vant has access to it, then the servant should assert any claim of
denial of due process before that tribunal, lest a later claim else-
where be barred. Examples are disputes about tardiness in a pro-
ceeding amounting to a denial of due process of law. A
nonprobationary servant who believes that his unfairly long suspen-
sion pending hearing denies him due process of law will be well
advised administratively to assert that unfairness along with his as-
sertion of violation of his substantive rights.
While selecting forums, both agencies and servants must keep in
mind any time limits for action stated by local law. If such limits
are either bars to action or restricted times to perfect inchoate
causes or claims, then activity in the wrong forum may not inter-
rupt their running. Time limits of those sorts operate in substance.
Though running of time is sometimes said to rob a tribunal of "ju-
risdiction," usually what it does is to rob a litigant of a claim or
defense, and mistaken activity in the wrong tribunal does not save
procedure due, see Vail v. Board of Educ., 706 F.2d 1435 (7th Cir. 1983) (Eschbach, J.,
concurring) and at 1453-56 (Posner, J., dissenting). The history of and exceptions to
the doctrine that the defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies does not op-
erate in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions are very well explained in Castelaz v. Milwaukee, 94
Wis. 2d 513, 514-16, 289 N.W.2d 259, 266-68 (1980).
150. To answer the question whether a position is a high level position for purposes
of implementing federal precedential distinctions used to define the extent of the privi-
lege of the servant to criticize superiors and the employing agency, requires recourse to
local law defining the office or duties of the servant and the organization of the agency.
See supra notes 6 and 7.
151. The court has ruled that arbitral decisions against employees claiming racial
discrimination and inadequate pay do not bar Title VII or Fair Labor Standards Act
suits alleging the same elements. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36
(1974); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 782 (1981). The
Supreme Court reversed an unreported Sixth Circuit decision which barred a claim of
discrimination a public employee had made and lost in a "just cause" arbitral hearing.
McDonald v. City of West Branch, 104 S. Ct. 1799 (1984). Stronger even than res
judicata is the defense of merger in judgment. In Bush v. Lucas, 103 S. Ct. 2404 (1983),
a public servant punished first by transfer and then by demotion, got back pay and
restoration of grade from an administrative tribunal but later sued in district court for
added relief. All three tiers of federal courts rejected his claim, ruling that the adminis-
trative relief authorized by statute was all he could obtain notwithstanding the constitu-
tional source of the substantive right (free speech) in question.
152. 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 139 (1965).
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the claim or defense. 153
D. The Time of Proceeding
1. Prior Hearing in General.-Nonprobationary or so called
tenured employees, by statute are often entitled to some form of
predetermination hearing to contest the issue of cause for discharge.
But it is typical for tenure statutes to allow suspension of an em-
ployee and his income pending hearing and resolution of the dis-
pute. 154 The existence of such suspensions without prior hearing
suggests that in real effect statutory predetermination hearing rights
hardly exist in the public service in the United States. As we shall
see' -55 when we come to the constitutional cases, such preliminary
suspension procedures have largely survived constitutional attack.
The stage for such attack has been set only when a court first has
found substantive rights and a requirement of a hearing. Then, and
only then, there arises a further question about timeliness: may the
agency interrupt work and income of a person to whom it has
promised employment continuity before it invokes or completes the
procedures required? This is a constitutional question distinct from
time limits and time bars established by local law.
The constitutional time inquiry asks what sequence of actions, if
any, does the due process clause require? Such a question differs
from questions of ripeness and from inquiries whether there be a
matter in bar of trial such as limitations or another affirmative de-
fense; it differs from the question whether a guarantee of speedy
trial has been violated or not. 156 Failure of an agency to invoke its
procedures soon enough or failure of the agency promptly to com-
plete its procedures, once invoked, may constitute defenses of the
employee as a matter of local law. 157 How such time limits should
be categorized is itself a question of local law.' 58 Some local stat-
153. For an example of a case in which plaintiff argued jurisdiction when he might
better have argued matter in bar or nonperfection of a cause for discharge, see Carter v.
State Bd. of Educ., 90 111. App. 3d 1042, 414 N.E.2d 153 (1980). On the distinctions
among dilatory pleas like want of jurisdiction, pleas in bar like limitations and justifica-
tion, pleas to the general issues, and the sui generis plea of want of speedy trial, see
Halligan, Speedy Trial and the Criminal Appeals Act, 55 MARQ. L. REV. 457 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as as Halligan, Speedy Trial].
154. 63A AM. JUR. 2D Public Officers and Employees §§ 255-60, esp. § 258 (1984)
(prior hearing not required by the due process clause).
155. See supra notes 2, 128-30, and infra notes 162-70, esp. 169. But see also supra
notes 100 and 101.
156. Halligan, Speedy Trial, supra note 153.
157. For example, Carter v. Board of Educ., 90 111. App. 3d 1042, 46 11. Dec. 431,
414 N.E.2d 153 (1980); Litin v. Board of Educ., 72 Ill. App. 3d 889, 28 I11. Dec. 863,
391 N.E.2d 62 (1979); Jones v. General Superintendent of Schools, 58 Ill. App. 3d 504,
16 Ill. Dec. 59, 374 N.E.2d 834 (1978).
158. Some time limits are more like speedy trial guarantees, others more like bars by
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utes with strict time limits introduce a concept of a no claim rule
which makes misconduct of a servant a merely inchoate ground for
discharge which must be perfected by the employing agency's tak-
ing prompt action. 59 Others introduce notions of waiver 60 or es-
toppel like those found in employment contract cases.' 6' All of
these subjects are important but do not define the sequence of ac-
tion required by the due process clause. Our subject here is timeli-
ness or promptness of deliberative procedures as an aspect of due
process and the lawfulness of adverse personnel action taken pend-
ing the outcome of those procedures. The prohibition of taking of
property or liberty "without" due process, taken literally, might im-
ply a requirement of prior adjudication of grounds whenever the
entity denying or taking is governmental. Thus, our inquiry is, in a
sense, how we should interpret the word "without" in the phrase
"without due process of law." The balance of interests test in Ma-
thews' 62 suggests, that the answer to the question when must a hear-
ing be scheduled, assuming it be necessary, likewise depends on the
surrounding circumstances.
Less poignant than Mathews v. Eldridge163 but more relevant
here is Arnett v. Kennedy,' 64 which explores due process of law in
public employee removal under United States Civil Service regula-
tions which permit managers to fire protected career service em-
ployees on thirty days notice. In Arnett the government had fired
plaintiff because he wrongly accused his superiors of bribery. He
sued without first demanding an administrative hearing. The post
dismissal hearing privilege sufficed to validate the statutory proce-
dure. The Court refused to excuse the failure of plaintiff to exercise
the privilege.
In retrospect, Arnett appears to be the start of a trend, which
continued with Mathews, to categorize subsequent proceedings as
way of limitation; yet others are like appellate court time limits, or like no claim rules
for want of timely perfection of the chose in action. Some are sui generis.
159. Some property rights or claims are "inchoate" and must be "perfected" by
more or less strict adherence to procedures within strict time limits. Perfection is a
more than usually important precondition to such a claim. The notion is that there is
no claim or right or property or lien absent the acts of perfection. In civil law the best
known example is the mechanics' lien. 53 AM. JUR. 2D Mechanics'Liens §§ 167, 178
(1970).
160. 53 Am. JUR. 2D Master and Servant § 47 (1970).
161. Waiver, of course, is an affirmative defense (or matter of reply when asserted
by plaintiff) whereas an assertion that an inchoate right of the plaintiff was never per-
fected is a defense litigated as a part of the general issues. 28 AM. JUR. 2D Estoppel and
Waiver §§ 168, 173 (1966).
162. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
163. Id.
164. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974). In effect the court permitted suspen-
sion without pay, pending hearing. See supra notes 2, 67, 116-17, 140-41, and infra note
187.
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generally sufficient constitutionally. Two cases validate common
law tort forms as adequate remedies for wrongs of the state. In
Parratt v. Taylor,165 trespass, negligence, and conversion were ruled
adequate remedies for loss by an inmate of his tangible personal
property on account of alleged wrongs by prison workers. In Ingra-
ham v. Wright, 166 the Court balanced the interests of school officials
and of pupils who recieve corporal punishment. It concluded that
the due process clause left local governments free to select abbrevi-
ated, informal prior hearing or instead to rely on initiation by a
pupil of post punishment hearing in a court of common law under
forms of action such as battery.
More recently, in a case of violation of first amendment rights,
the Court found the after the fact personnel code remedy in the
federal service not only an adequate but an exclusive remedy.1 67
The initiative changes in such cases.1 68 The plaintiff sues after the
governmental agency has acted. These moderate balancing tests
contrast with absolutist arguments that the constitution requires an
adversarial proceeding in advance of any serious adverse personnel
decisions affecting a non-probationary public servant.
The policy of balancing interests reflects traditional values. Bal-
ancing of interests is a technique of the law of torts and especially of
the law of negligence.' 69 Nor is the balancing of interests new in
first amendment cases. In United States v. Dennis, 70 Judge
Learned Hand proposed that in each case the court evaluate alter-
natives by ascertaining the gravity of potential harm of each alter-
native weighted by the probability or improbability that the
potential harm will occur.
2. Prior Hearing of Disputes About Free Expression: Interests
Protected and Interests Not Protected by the First Amendment.-
Some tribunal equipped to conduct adversarial hearings should be
open to a citizen who asserts that a government has violated his
165. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
166. 430 U.S. 651, 679-80 (1977), where the opinion uses the methodology of a
calculus of interests like that used in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
167. Bush v. Lucas, 103 S. Ct. 2404 (1983).
168. The general effect of providing an administrative hearing after the fact and
requiring the implicated citizen to initiate it by demand, was explored in Fahey v. Mal-
lonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947), cited with approval in Arnett, 416 U.S. at 153-54, which
held that such later hearing initiated by plaintiff fulfilled the guarantee of due process.
In Fahey, owners of a savings association attacked the constitutionality of a federal
statute under which defendant administrator had seized its assets on grounds of mis-
management and danger to depositors. The statute allowed owners to contest the
seizure and regain possession and control. But the initiative to seek administrative hear-
ing was with the owners and delay might be substantial.
169. 57 AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 70 (1971).
170. 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). The Supreme Court
uses a Dennis type calculus in due process cases. See supra notes 137-44.
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right to free expression by firing him. But before a government may
fire a servant, must he have an opportunity of prior hearing to test
his allegations? Many servants claim the answer is yes. The proce-
dural right claimed is priority of hearing; the source is said to be the
due process clause. Particularly interesting are assertions of such
due process rights for probationary and at will employees rather
than for "tenured" servants. But to understand the former, let us
consider the latter first.
When they arise, disputes about free expression of tenured ser-
vants will usually be implicated in disputes about the possible exist-
ence of cause for discipline. This may imply a right to a hearing in
advance of discharge because the discharge is itself a forfeiture or
taking of an independent right deemed property for purposes of the
fourteenth amendment. In that situation the first amendment and
fourteenth amendment are both violated by a wrongly motivated
discharge effected without hearing. Yet one can imagine a case in
which there exists an unambiguous but unconstitutional local rule
limiting speech of public servants. In such a case, one may hypoth-
esize a violation of the first amendment without simultaneous viola-
tion of the fourteenth.
Assume a public servant who readily admits his affiliation with
an organization which is prescribed under local law; assume that
non-affiliation with that organization is a locally well defined pre-
condition to continuity of employment with the agency in question;
assume further that the local precedents have definitely decided that
the affiliation in question is not protected by the first amendment.
Assume even further, however, that the employee disputes the local
precedents and wishes to assert his federal first amendment rights
and to challenge the state precedents as error. Must a nonproba-
tionary servant in these circumstances insist on a hearing prior to
his discharge, await discharge, and thereafter take his case to the
federal court or to the state court with general subject matter juris-
diction? From the viewpoint of the servant, he should not have to
demand futile local hearings before having access to federal or state
court. And from the viewpoint of the governmental employer, can
it be said that the employing agency has violated the rights of the
servant to due process should it fail to convene a prior hearing?
Arguably, the answer is no. If there is no dispute about the local
contractual conditions and their nonfulfillment, then there is no ob-
ligation, one might argue, to conduct any pre-discharge hearing.
But the holding in Perry v. Sindermann17 1 and the dicta in Board of
Regents v. Roth172 imply the contrary. Those cases seem to require
171. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
172. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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public employers to afford prior hearings to tenured servants but
not to others, in order to try first amendment disputes surrounding
job terminations. The requirement of prior hearing for tenured ser-
vants depends on local law and employment contracts. Yet the
safeguards of first amendment rights of such servants are imposed
whether or not local agencies have made any special promises or
commitments about free speech. It is as if an agency that promises
any substantive employment security, must also promise special so-
licitude for free speech or, at the least, must afford extraordinary
procedural protection of free speech of some servants if it has prom-
ised them other things. This makes job security of any sort an in-
voluntary carrier of special safeguards of free speech, or a sort of
tying requirement, a mandatory package deal imposed by the
Supreme Court. Later we will criticize this adhesive treatment of
job security and free speech. But first we must explore its implica-
tions and demonstrate the anomalies it produces in different treat-
ment of tenured and nontenured public servants.
In a case like the one hypothesized the tenured servant should
have ready access to state and federal courts to allege denial of free
speech but not to allege denial of due process. Yet a hypothetical of
this sort is improbable. A tenured servant will usually enjoy some
locally defined right to hearing, prior to dismissal, in some forum,
when the asserted cause for discharge is an act by him allegedly
protected by the first amendment, and he is well advised to exercise
the right to prior hearing. But the assertion of a right to prior hear-
ing is not cogent when made by probationary servants or servants of
agencies that have no tenure system. By definition, such an em-
ployee is a servant to whom the agency has not promised continuity
of employment. It follows that the agency need not convene or ap-
proach any tribunal before adverse action.
Probationary and other nontenured public servants dispute
this 17 3 conclusion when they allege that the motive of their superi-
ors in dismissing them was opposition to their opinions. 174 Many
cases arise in agencies where some servants are tenured but plaintiff
is untenured. 175 However, the argument has not been made that to
give some servants security against dismissal on account of opinion
denies equal protection to others not tenured. 176 Rather, the argu-
173. For example, Palmer v. Board of Educ., 603 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1026 (1980).
174. Plaintiff servants would like to be able to secure procedural barriers to their
discharge by their unilateral acts of making charges. But this bootstrap argument has
been rejected. See supra notes 2, 67, 77, 128-30, 151-53, 164, and infra note 201.
175. Untenured servants most given to claim breach of first amendment rights are
probationary and junior faculty in public schools and colleges where tenure systems are
widespread.
176. Where some but not all servants are tenured under local law, such an argu-
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ment seems to be that the first amendment creates not only freedom
from prior restraint and criminal punishment of speech but also a
property interest in a public servants' position for the purposes of
the due process clause. The argument was brushed aside in Palmer
v. Board of Education 7 7 and it is fair to predict that the Supreme
Court would reject it also. This prediction can be categorized three
ways, each of which has different implications for construction of
the first amendment. The three parts of prediction parallel three
different possible categorizations of an act of a government to dis-
charge an employee deliberately on account of opposition to an
opinion she has expressed.
One categorization of such dismissal is that it is itself a trespass
on a right or an injuria. This categorization puts dismissal in the
same category as, say, seizure of pamphlets. The best indication
that the Court will not so categorize a dismissal is dicta in Board qf
Regents v. Roth178 which distinguishes direct and indirect infringe-
ment, for a limited right of a probationary servant to so much employment continuity as
is needed to foster free expression, would not claim that employment security is an
interest of public servants protected by the first amendment, but would assert that the
guarantee of equal protection forbids a government's affording employment security
against dismissal on account of opinions to some servants but not to others. This proves
too much and produces unreasonable consequences. What the argument tends to assert
is this: if an agency promises employment security of any sort to any servants, then, at a
minimum, it must someway provide for the resolution, before termination, of disputes
between the agency and any of its servants concerning allegations of trespass by the
agency on the rights of free expression of the servants. It might be a fine idea to do such
a thing, but it seems on the face of it to be an extreme proposal to oblige all state and
local and federal agencies to do so. Another reason to repudiate the argument is that it
is doctrinally inelegant. This argument for a requirement of prior proceedings before
any termination where there is alleged to be a dispute about free expression, is an argu-
ment based not on the amendment which protects free expression, the first amendment,
but upon the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment
coupled with the choice of an agency to promise employment security of an extraordi-
nary sort to some servants and not others. It is strange or even bizarre to derive proce-
dural rights designed to protect free expression not from indestructable substantive
rights created by the first amendment but from local substantive tenure rights which an
agency can obviate and which are, at that, rights of third persons. Unlike the argu-
ments more often made, this sort of argument would be possible only when an agency
promises tenure to some of its employees. Such arguments have failed in the few cases
where plaintiffs have made them. See supra notes 114 and 115.
177. 603 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1026 (1980).
178. In Roth, the Supreme Court, in dicta, commented that "[i]n the respondent's
case, however, the State has not directly impinged upon interests in free speech ...
[T]he interest in holding a teaching job at a state university, simpliciter, is not itself a
free speech interest." Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 575 n.14 (1972). The Court contrasted post
speech discharge with such things as pre-utterance injunction of speech or pre-sale
seizure of writings. In the text of the opinion, the Court said that the first amendment
issues in the case below were not before it. Id. at 574. In Tygrett v. Barry, 627 F.2d
1279 (D.C. Cir., 1980), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals remanded and di-
rected the trial court to fashion remedies, but stated that in the case of a probationary
police officer there is no "tenure" to be "protected." Id. at 1283. Since the due process
clause is not mentioned, the intent must be to say that loss of a job in a case grounded
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ment of free speech for purposes of the due process clause. Another
indication is the appreciation 179 of the distinction between injuria
and damnum and the view that dismissal is often only the latter.
Rejection of this first categorization is just, because it recognizes
differences in both the character and results of different restrictions.
Firing a servant who has spoken does not literally prevent the utter-
ance as does injunction, seizure, or arrest, and its character is less
drastic than criminal prosecution for having spoken. Rejecting this
first alternative classification directs exploration of both first
amendment and due process questions along reasonable lines and
fosters a balancing of interests rather than an abrupt conclusion. I
The second categorization would be to classify retaliatory dismis-
sal as damnum or a compensable consequence of a violation of the
right of. free speech. Under either of these first two constructions,
employment security is impliedly an interest protected by the first
amendment. In the first view it is a principal interest protected.
That would imply a strong claim of a procedural right to prior hear-
ing lest an essential substantive right be forfeited without due pro-
cess of law. The Court, as stated,181 seems to reject that view. The
second view could be adopted with or without finding a right to a
prior hearing and requires more analysis than the other two alterna-
tives. We will return to it after discussing the third categorization of
retaliatory dismissal.
The third category is injuria sine damnum. This category again
presupposes protected speech of plaintiff. But under this view the
practical loss is not a legally recognized loss. That is, the practical
hardship is not legally cognizable as damage. Stated yet another
way, this third view is the notion that employment security is not an
interest protected 82 by the first amendment. Some authority for
on the first amendment is damnum and not injuria. The opinion says nothing about
damages assessment.
179. Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980). See also Carey v.
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
180. In Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978), the Court in effect subsumed the
constitutional wrong of violation of the due process clause to the tort of case, not tres-
pass, by disallowing presumptions of compensable damages and requiring specific proof
of individual harm. In Delaware State College, 449 U.S. 250, the court again drew the
distinction between injuria and damnum and ruled that the Title VII limitations begin
to run when defendant commits the wrong or injuria and not later when the conse-
quence or damnum become complete. The opinion indicates that actual removal from a
position and cessation of wage payments may sometimes be the injuria or wrongful act
and sometimes the consequences of a breach or violation of or a deviation from right.
See also infra notes 219-22.
181. See supra notes 178 and 179.
182. In this Article, the phrase "interest protected" has the meaning of the phrase
found in treatises on damages and the like. The phrase "protected speech" in constitu-
tional law, though perhaps prompted by the common law phrase, differs. The concept
of interests protected is partly substantive and partly adjective law. The concept of
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that view is dicta1 83 mentioned earlier and rationales in cases of em-
ployee discipline by means less drastic than outright dismissal.18 4
Perhaps in rationales of permissible subsidies 18 5 and other instances
of governmental support of points of view, 186 one can find yet more
protected speech, whatever its origins, is now a concept of substantive law. Viewing
retaliatory discharge of an outspoken public servant as injuria sine damnum implies
that wages and work are not interests protected by the first amendment. But the view of
discharge as damnum absque injuria tends to imply that the speech in question is
wholly or partly unprotected speech. A few points of the substantive law of the first
amendment separating protected speech from unprotected speech are found at supra
notes 4-57 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 178 and 179. But compare Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd.
of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), and Tygrett v. Barry, 627 F.2d 1279 (D.C. Cir.,
1980). In both those cases the courts said that a probationary, nontenured servant may
sue for damages for violation of first amendment rights when his public employer has
discharged him on account of an expression of opinion or proposal by him.
184. Cases in which servants transferred to less attractive duties have recovered or
at least sustained their complaints against demurrer when they alleged a motive of de-
fendant agency to retaliate for speech of plaintiff criticizing the agency or its officials are
cited in Riechert v. Draud, 511 F. Supp. 679 nn.7, 10 (E.D. Ky. 1981), and at first view
seem to cut the other way. But the court reads them generally to include allegations
either of pay reduction or of "demotion" in some other real and substantial sense in
circumstances of tenure or civil service systems. The opinion concludes that a plaintiff
must qualitatively allege a "legally cognizable" harm besides a great enough quantum of
harm. Id. at 686. While suggesting that subjection to adverse action with substantial,
objective competence to chill speech might sometimes per se be legally cognizable harm,
the rationale seems to be that usually the harm alleged must be loss of all or part of a
right, other than freedom of speech, created by local law, such as employment security
and pay for such employment. In Riechert the court found retaliatory motive, found
that the motive in fact led directly and immediately to change in work assignment of
plaintiff, and found that the change distressed plaintiff and did not help the employing
agency, but nevertheless adjudicated for defendant. On the facts, the teacher plaintiff
had for seventeen years taught an elective course in psychology in senior high school
and enrollment in it was full. Id. at 682. The principal switched her to a mandatory
junior high school English class because she had criticized pupil assignments and other
actions. She had job tenure but no guarantee of program content.
185. The Court sustained the statute awarding subsidies for presidential campaigns
of only "major" parties in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 92-93 (1976). Query, are the
abortion funding decisions additional authority justifying use of non civil service pay-
rolls and the processes of employment or even dismissal to support some views, opin-
ions, or values? The abortion funding cases sustained state and federal statutes against
various challenges including ones based on the first amendment and ruled that state and
federal agencies may subsidize parturition and not subsidize abortion as a reflection of
policies to favor life and parturition and to discourge abortion. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S.
464 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 917 (1980). See
supra notes 33-39, 51, 52, and 84.
186. The clearest examples of state subsidy of ideology are school and university
curricula and research plans, programs, and budgets which usually are loaded to favor
some subjects, often very specifically, and some methodologies and methods of research
and instruction, while others are virtually neglected completely. Yet these choices seem
impenetrable to constitutional attack even when changes in appropriations make indi-
vidual employees redundant. See supra notes 33-39. Let us reconsider Mt. Healthy, 429
U.S. 274 at this point. The Court says that want of tenure does not bar a plaintiff from
asserting dismissal or non-rehiring as a trespass on rights of speech. But the Court
views the action of the school board, so far as it constitutes a reaction to speech of
plaintiff, as no more than a petulant "ad hoc response" to an acerbic teacher who dis-
liked a proposed dress code. Id. at 282. Query, would more deliberate action on a more
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authority for this notion of damages not cognizable or interests not
protected. On this view, loss of public employment by an outspo-
ken servant is withdrawal of a subsidy of his viewpoint and not a
harm inflicted, penalty, or damnum. While there are contrary
cases 187 currently read in several different ways by members of the
Supreme Court, 188 some pledge cases 89 and other cases limiting
rights of association' 90 of public servants might support this con-
ception of public employment as might some cases' 91 which uphold
dismissal of servants who criticize the program of the agency
though they neither obstruct the program nor refuse to perform
their own part in it.192 On the other hand, the patronage' 93 cases
are opposed to this view of public service but not as strongly as one
might suppose, 194 especially when they are read along with the
serious subject like the curriculum be a different matter? Suppose, for example, that
Doyle had sneered at the curriculum and that the emphasis or sentiment of the board
had been not firing Doyle but recruiting another person truly enthusiastic about the
designated curriculum and keen to teach it? What result then? Suggested, the outcome
would have been different. See supra note 17.
187. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367
U.S. 488 (1961); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886
(1961); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1946).
188. Compare the reading of four judges who joined in the opinion of the Court in
Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 356-60 (1976), with that of the dissent of three judges, Id.
at 387-89. Two judges specially concurring in the result only said that questions about
politically biased hiring had not been presented and should not have been mentioned.
Id. at 374-75.
189. See, e.g., Biklen v. Board of Educ., 406 U.S. 951 (1972).
190. Again to use public education as a touchstone, both mandatory membership
and prohibition of membership in unions and occupational associations have withstood
constitutional challenge, 68 AM. JUR. 2D Schools §§ 131, 175 (1952), and unconven-
tional sexual preferences unaccompanied by criminal or indiscreet conduct have some-
times disqualified applicants for teaching positions and led to dismissal of persons
already serving. Id. at §§ 133, 176.
191. Schmidt v. Fremont Co. School Dist., 558 F.2d 982 (10th Cir. 1977); Kaprelian
v. Texas Woman's Univ., 509 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1975). But this aspect of those cases
may have been undercut by the Supreme Court, supra note 6 and 7. However, the
Supreme Court precedents do not diminish the value of Kaprelian, Schmidt, and cases
cited in supra notes 8-22, as authority for the proposition that nonperformance is not
protected. Moreover, Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), somewhat limits Picker-
ing, 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
192. It should go almost without saying that an employee who fails to perform his
assigned tasks or obstructs agency business ought to be discharged without any inquiry
about whether his motive be religion or other beliefs. See supra notes 8 and 22. The
reason is that nonperformance is not protected speech, and that reason operates
whether or not employment security be an interest protected by the first amendment.
See supra note 182.
193. Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
194. The only thing very certain is that patronage dismissal of low level, nonten-
ured, non-policy making employees is illegal when motivated by their refusal to join a
party, contribute money to its treasury, canvass voters for its candidates, and obtain
endorsement or sponsorship from its captains. Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347. The jus-
tices could not agree on a majority opinion. There is no reason to suppose that in a
patronage firing case the elements are fewer or modes of proof less demanding than in
other suits based on the first amendment. See supra note 183. Rules and statutes re-
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cases195 and statutes1 96 limiting partisan activity of public servants.
First amendment cases 197 adjudging for defendants are easier to
read as decisions finding either that the activity or speech was not
protected or that the trespass by the employing agency was justified
by compelling government need. That is, cases insinuating injuria
sine damnum are more readily read as cases finding damnum ab-
sque injuria, in other words, finding no trespass1 98 upon substantive
first amendment rights. The third view is not likely to prevail.
Under this third conception of dismissal of one who has spoken
protected speech, injuria sine damnum, a plaintiff who is a nonten-
ured servant can claim no violation of the due process clause be-
cause the precedents' 99 are clear that where the thing plaintiff has
lost is not legally protected, then no deprivation of property oc-
curred and he has no right to hearing or process.
Since the first categorization has been repudiated and the third
categorization of discharge is unlikely to become operative, we re-
turn to the second. That is the view that discharge of a public ser-
vant is a compensable loss when it is a proven consequence of a
wrongful motive of the employing government to suppress or quiet
speech. The question then becomes: can a nontenured servant dis-
missed without prior hearing, who proves the motive and causal
connection between it and his loss of work, sue not only for restric-
tion of speech but for denial of due process?2° As a preliminary
quiring public servants to refrain from partisan political activity have been sustained.
See infra note 195. On many aspects of patronage, issues are open and circuits are
divided. Annot., 51 L.Ed.2d 924, § 8 (1978). To be distinguished are cases brought not
by non civil service employees themselves but by candidates for office and their voting,
taxpaying supporters who claim disenfranchisement of office seekers and voters who
must oppose a publicly paid patronage army. Shakman v. Democratic Org. of Cook
Co., 435 F.2d 267 (7th Cir. 1970).
195. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413
U.S. 548 (1973); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
196. All fifty of the states have enacted a "Little Hatch Act." See 413 U.S. at 604
n.2.
197. See supra notes 189-91, and 195.
198. See supra notes 4-57 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 125-29. In the Iranian hostage bargain litigation, the Supreme
Court reasoned that when rights are frustrated by the government, the frustration is
actionable as taking of property without due process of law only if the rights were
judicialy enforceable by both judgment and also execution or attachment. Only mone-
tarily collectible choses in action destroyed by the government can be said to be prop-
erty taken without due process. Seemingly wrongful destruction of an uncollectable
claim is no more actionable as a denial of due process than action thoroughly without
fault. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 688 n.14 (1981).
200. Realistically, the risk of liability for an added increment of monetary damages
imposed because a dismissal violated not only the first amendment, but simultaneously
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment is a trivial exposure after Carey v.
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978). The more serious matter would be bills by servants for
injunctions forbidding discharge pending trial. Query, assuming employment con-
tinuity as an interest, of servants without local tenure, protected by the first amend-
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point we can say that the servant must prove a retaliatory motive
and causation; it is not enough that he show he charged those ele-
ments or raised them in discussion before his discharge.20 1 But even
assuming such proof, the answer should be no. In taking up the
question, we assume job security as an interest protected202 by the
first amendment but reason that post discharge suits in courts of
general jurisdiction are an adequate remedy when the competing
factors are computed by the calculus of Mathews.2 0 3
The private interests are not strong. The speech itself will not
have been restrained.2°4 The loss of the public job may be more or
less severe. The probationary status or the absence of a tenure sys-
tem implies few expectations of job security and no forfeiture of
accumulated property. Continued work, after uttered speech, in a
job without tenured status under local law, is not, in the constitu-
tional hierarchy, a great right. As stated before, its very existence
as a constitutionally protected interest is questionable.20 5 More-
over, suspension pending hearing would be available to the em-
ployer so that interruption of income of servants would often occur
in any event. 20 6
The probability that an added safeguard of pre-termination hear-
ing will prevent many ill motivated dismissals is small. A post dis-
charge suit is an adequate deterrence and existence of pre-
termination hearing rights is not likely to make proof of motive and
causation any easier. Reduced injustice or lesser error in individual
cases is not a likely consequence of extending a right of pre-termina-
tion hearing to probationary employees even when they have strong
evidence they were fired because they expressed opinions contrary
to those of their superiors.
Moreover, the burden on the governmental employers would be
great. Even a suspended employee can interfere with operations.
For one thing, his position cannot readily be filled because local
rules often closely regulate recruitment of persons to fill positions of
ment, then what quantum of proof of suppressive motive and of causation should the
chancellor require before compelling hearing and what duration of preliminary injunc-
tion might a chancellor order?
201. Plaintiffs mere assertion of a protected interest is not enough to give him a
right to procedural due process. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 575 n. 14; Perry
v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 599 n.5. One must actually have and prove the substantive
right in order to have, and to be able to prove violation of, procedural rights. See supra
notes 125-30. See also supra notes 2, 67, and 77.
202. This assumption is not ungenerous to non civil service public servants. See
supra notes 171-98.
203. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). For more detail see supra notes 131-44.
204. The point must again be made that discharging a servant who has spoken dif-
fers from arresting him after he has only just begun to speak.
205. See supra notes 130-46.
206. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
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suspended workers. Absent suspension, the agency work place has
a sort of lame duck servant hanging about awaiting trial and preoc-
cupied with its outcome and not with his duties. Poor effects on
morale and efficiency of persons close by are likely. Another bur-
den possible is occasional evasion of probation systems by servants.
Unruly or inefficient servants near the end of a probationary period
will be tempted to extend their service by demanding pre-termina-
tion hearings, insincerely alleging an intent of their superiors to sup-
press protected speech, and then use every method to postpone and
prolong the pre-termination hearings. When the costs and benefits
on both sides are evaluated and estimated, the better policy emerg-
ing is that dismissed public servants without local tenure or civil
service status should be obliged to assert any claims of violation of
the first amendment in courts of general jurisdiction after the fact.
The due process clause should not be construed to afford them any
right to pre-termination hearing.
This is the right place to explore how the notions of free speech
and tenure may have become confused. One source is use of the
word tenure in educational employment contracts, especially in the
private sector, juxtaposed with phrases like academic freedom,
which sounds like constitutional free speech though its history and
office are different.
Academic freedom is a privilege often guaranteed in employment
contracts of some or all of university faculty. Contractual job se-
curity in a wider sense is also granted by contract to a smaller
number of senior faculty and such faculty are said to be "tenured."
Thus, tenure and rights of free expression are associated by their
companionship in some employment contracts. It will be beneficial
to compare contractual academic freedom and constitutional free
speech.
The term academic freedom is rarely used in reports of judicial
opinions and its meaning is somewhat variable. Historically, aca-
demic freedom in the United States as conceived by its leading pro-
ponents such as the American Association of University Professors,
has been a claim of privilege to publish findings of research and to
express opinions related to one's research in the community gener-
ally. It has not included a claim by leading academics, and their
scholarly associations, of privileges not to teach material assigned
or to introduce material to the classroom not pertinent to the an-
nounced subject of the course or class, and has contained only a
limited claim of privilege to criticize material one has been assigned
to convey. 20 7 According to Hofstadter and Metzger, the privilege,
207. Even moderately ambitious proponents of "academic freedom" have conceded
the obligations of a contracting teacher to avoid introducing material irrelevant to the
[Vol. 21
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when recognized at all, was established by contract, and such con-
tracts for a long time were enforced more by moral persuasion208
than by litigation. The same authors say that protective clauses
were included mostly in the contracts between research institutions
and their research professors.20 9 But such clauses were often con-
strued narrowly by institutions and even more narrowly by
courts.210 Before Tinker v. Des Moines Community School Dis-
trict,211 and Pickering v. Board of Education,212 the freedom of ex-
pression of a faculty member of a state institution as a citizen even
outside the classroom was restricted somewhat by institutional re-
taliation and was protected little by freedom clauses in tenure or
employment contracts. 21 3 In private sector contract litigation be-
tween faculty and institution, the restrictive cases cited by Byse and
Murphy, and by Emerson and Haber, including state university
cases rationalized on contractual grounds, are still good law and
should be briefed by lawyers for parties to such suits. 21 4 But the
circumstances are now different in the public sector.
Since Pickering,21 5 public employees (and older pupils) in colleges
syllabus, to teach the prescribed syllabus competently, and either to adopt a posture of
neutrality in the classroom on issues where there is room for genuine difference of infer-
ence or opinion or even to promote the partisan or sectarian predilection of the employ-
ing institution if at the time of employment it has notified him or her of its expectation
he or she do so, the leading freedom of opinion of the academic being advanced being
"full freedom in research and in the publication of the results." HOFSTADTER & METZ-
GER, supra note 21, at 407-12, 480-90 (emphasis added) (citing policies of the Am. Ass'n
of Univ. Professors Achievements: The AAUP As An Agent Of Codification).
208. Id. at 490-95. The early codes of the AAUP never disputed the legal authority
of trustees of institutions to limit the freedom even of publication, and those codes ap-
parently conceded the point even for state institutions. HOFSTADTER & METZGER,
supra note 21, at 409. Among research minded academics there even has been, more
than tolerance, some equivocal support for some institutional control not just of speech
within the lecture hall but of extramural speech or at least of the style or decorum
thereof, so long as the senior faculty or its committees have a large share in the govern-
ance. Id. at 407-12.
209. HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note 21, at 368-82.
210. Byse, Academic Freedom, Tenure, and the Law: A Comment on Worzella v.
Board of Regents, 73 HARV. L. REV. 304 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Byse]; W. Mur-
phy, Academic Freedom, 28 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 447 (1963) [hereinafter cited
as Murphy]. See supra note 5.
211. 393 U.S. 503 (1969), was a case of pupils' rights but contained dicta concerning
rights of expression of teachers about the schoolhouse generally, as opposed to speech
inside the classroom during instruction. Id. at 506.
212. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
213. Emerson & Haber, Academic Freedom of the Faculty Member as a Citizen, 28
LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 525 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Emerson & Haber].
Koch v. University of III., 39 Ill. App. 2d 51, 187 N.E.2d 340 (1963), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 989 (1964) (treating the issue of one of employment contract law).
214. See generally Byse, supra note 210, at 304; Murphy, supra note 210, at 447; and
Emerson & Haber, supra note 213. Even the academic profession itself, or its research
minded members anyway, as noted before, have not been certain of their desire for
complete freedom even outside the classroom and lecture hall. See supra note 208.
215. 391 U.S. 563.
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and schools have not had to tilt at windmills like academic freedom
for events outside the classroom and, as noted later, assertions of a
privilege of non-conformity in the classroom have failed with hardly
a judicial word216 about academic freedom. Today academic free-
dom clauses are significant in employment contracts of private uni-
versities but of reduced significance in the public sector.
Academic freedom in the private sector is probably less generous
than the constitutional privilege of free speech in the public sector,
especially after Givhan.217 Of course, an employer, public or pri-
vate, may by contract or rule voluntarily afford a servant more lib-
erty than the constitutional minimum guaranteed for servants in the
public service.218 And it may do that without also affording em-
ployment security in other particulars. This brings us again to the
observation that while free expression and tenure are often associ-
ated and understandably so, they are not identical.
E. Damages for Denial of Procedural Due Process
Not all losses caused by a breach of duty need be compensated by
verdicts. What damages should be awarded to one who suffers a
denial of due process of law? Courts should award damages to
compensate for the loss of the property right or other substantive
good the existence of which gives rise to the duty to afford due pro-
cess, and there is little dispute about that. But what damages, if
any, should be awarded to one who experiences a denial of due pro-
cess but does not suffer a loss of protected property or liberty? Are
there any incidental interests protected? In Carey v. Piphus,2 19
plaintiff school children had a right under local law to free instruc-
tion in public schools. That substantive right was conditioned on
obedience to school rules. Asserting disobedience of the plaintiffs,
principals of schools in Chicago expelled the pupils with periods
greater than ten days. The school officials had not established any
mechanism to resolve impasses or factual disputes for pupils who
contest a charge of disobedience. The pupils sued alleging a denial
of the substantive right of several days instruction and also a denial
of procedural due process. However, they did not allege that the
charges of infraction of the rules were untrue. Nor did they allege
that, had a tribunal been convened to hear evidence before expul-
216. By the time Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), came up for decision,
Justice Marshall could say that possession of tenure by plaintiff was "irrelevant" to his
first amendment claims. Id. at 605.
217. 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
218. For example, one section of the Hatch Act exempts educational employees of
the District of Columbia from the prohibitions on speech which the act places on other
federal employees. 5 U.S.C.S. § 7324(c) (Law. Co-op 1980).
219. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
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sion, it would have found in favor of the pupils. In short, the pupils
did not allege that they would not have been expelled had they re-
ceived a fair hearing prior to expulsion. In substance, the district
court found for the defendants, but the court of appeals reversed,
reasoning220 that the failure to have a pre-expulsion adjudicatory
mechanism was a constitutional violation which should be compen-
sated by monetary damages even though grounds for expulsion ex-
isted and would have been found by an impartial administrative
trier of fact. The Supreme Court reversed. It ruled that a plaintiff
may not receive more than nominal damages for a denial of proce-
dural due process unless he also pleads and proves that he lost a
substantive right or good different from due process itself. The
Court states that for a plaintiff to recover damages for a denial of
procedural due process, he must prove that the proceeding, the ab-
sence of which is the subject of the complaint, would have resulted
in a finding for the plaintiff and his retention of a substantive right
or good.22' The Court ruled that denial of procedural due process
by itself is worth no more than one United States dollar but inti-
mated that, if proved, actual subjective mental hurt or indignity
produced by denial of due process would be compensable even if the
merits in the underlying dispute were with defendant.222 These
dicta, coupled with the cases joining the due process clause and the
first amendment when plaintiff is "tenured" under local law, effec-
tively expand the damages tenured plaintiffs can obtain on an alle-
gation of violation of their right of free speech by their public
employer and require us to reconsider the cases linking the two con-
stitutional provisions.
F Burden of Proof and Standard of Review
Since Carey v. Piphus2 23 cleared the air, there have been no spe-
cial rules of proof, presumptions, or shifting burdens in due process
cases unmixed with first amendment claims. Since legal issues
predominate, reviewing courts may deliberate 224 nearly ab initio on
220. But the court of appeals agreed with the district court and Supreme Court that
there could be no recovery for lost time from instruction without proof that the absent
administrative hearing would have avoided the loss by a ruling against suspension or
expulsion. Id. at 260-61.
221. Id. at 260-61.
222. Id. at 266-67. The reason is that even indignity or hurt feelings will not be
presumed from a denial of due process but must be proved, Id. at 262-64. Query:
should the dicta concerning compensability of mental discomposure be made a rule of
decision? Should they be extended to public servant discharge cases? If so, should
mental discomposure of untenured servants be compensable in first amendment cases?
223. 435 U.S. 247 (1978). See supra notes 128 and 129.
224. Constructions of written contracts and findings of local law are freely review-
able. 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2588,
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the issues.
V. PERRY V SINDERMAN RECONSIDERED
The opinion in Pickering22 5 emphasized and Connick22 6 reas-
serted that freedom of speech of public servants is a right of citizen-
ship and not a special attribute of their employment. Public
servants have no more freedom of speech than anyone else. The
holding in Perry v. Sinderman22 7 and dicta in Board of Regents v.
Roth228 contradict these principles. It is true that Perry does not
define more substantive freedom of speech of public servants. But it
does grant some of them more procedural safeguards of that free-
dom than other citizens enjoy. Tenured servants are peers of the
rest of us. Freedom of speech is a civil right. The reasoning of
Perry and Roth excessively conflates different expectations. But
more unwholesome than elaborate rationales are deleterious results.
Besides confusion, the practical consequences of Perry are demorali-
zation, reduced efficiency, and a backlash that harms dutiful public
servants.
The court in Perry derived elevated federal procedural rights, in
aid of substantive freedom of speech, from repealable state law.
This must deter states and local agencies from promising security or
extending civil service or merit systems, because it means a local
agency must also budget for special adjudicative expense and added
levels of review and litigation if it makes any promise of job secur-
ity. Also, it must extend the benefits and incur the cost of added
levels of review and adjudication to topics like free speech that are
already justiciable in courts. Though other interpretations2 29 of
Perry are possible, the view currently prevailing2 30 is that it dictates
that a state which wants to give any substantive job security, must
also give servants a great deal of procedural benefits, including prior
2589 (1971). This is especially so when first amendment issues articulate with public
employment law. See supra note 68.
225. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
226. 103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983).
227. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
228. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
229. A competing view is that the state remedies afforded are part of the substantive
state right and that the federal courts should not deem a right to be constitutional
"property" unless the state remedies available include extraordinary measures like de-
crees of specific performance. Vail v. Board of Educ., 706 F.2d 1435, 1432 (7th Cir.
1983) (Posner, J., dissenting), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court, 104 S. Ct.
2144 (1984); Barthuli v. Board of Trustees, 434 U.S. 1337 (1977) (order of Justice
Rehnquist denying stay of enforcement).
230. In Barthuli v. Board, 434 U.S. at 1337, Justice Rehnquist predicted that the
judges who were his colleagues in 1977 would reject the view that the state remedies
available should influence the decision whether to characterize a substantive right as
constitutional "property." Vail v. Board of Educ., 706 F.2d 1435, aff'd per curiam by
an equally divided court, 104 S. Ct. 2144 (1984). See also supra notes 93-101.
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administrative hearing, that are redundant on some points with ex-
isting safeguards, viz., access to courts to seek compensation for de-
nial of free speech. When an incremental approach is disallowed,
some authorities will choose to give nothing or to remove modest
benefits theretofore afforded. 231 As to efficiency of the public ser-
vice, the detriment of redundant procedural safeguards is by now
well documented.2 32 And the interplay among the first amendment,
the due process clause, and local law is subtle even for lawyers and
generates complex litigation. But more than that, such contingen-
cies create envy because probationary servants, employees of agen-
cies without a tenure or civil service system, and people who work
in the private sector will not readily understand why so many extra
resources are allocated to protect just a few citizens in the exercise
of a right that is supposed to be common to all. Nonprobationary
civil service employees who claim infringement of their rights under
the first amendment should receive the same ration of procedural
opportunities to assert and realize the right, at about the same times
and places as other citizens enforcing the same rights. This suggests
a larger or wider doubt about the wisdom and fairness of Perry.
Why should essentially contractual expectations of public servants
in agencies with civil service or like guarantees, have a federal con-
stitutional right to expedited or even prior hearing and federal court
oversight of the mechanisms for hearing? Aggrieved independent
contractors who sell services and goods to local governments must
litigate after the fact in the courts unless the local agency has cho-
sen to create an administrative tribunal. Salaried servants in the
private sector with written employment contracts usually expect
they will have to sue for breach after the fact in the courts unless an
express arbitration clause or the like is provided. Unions and em-
ployers have the same expectations. A local government should be
free contractually to promise procedural safeguards greater than
public law guarantees, but should not be obliged to do that by the
federal judiciary. Creating a constitutional class of procedurally
privileged characters does not advance the public interest.
CONCLUSION
As a general proposition public servants enjoy the same rights of
231. In Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), a plurality of three justices came
very near to overruling Perry by saying that a public employee must accept any proce-
dural bitter with the substantive sweet of job security that a personnel statute serves.
416 U.S. at 152-53 (Burger, Rehnquist, and Stewart, JJ.). The other six justices, three
dissenting and three joining in the judgment but not in the plurality opinion, disagreed
with that view.
232. The opinion in Connick v. Myers, 103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983), notes the effect as
had Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. at 169-70.
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free speech as others. They may criticize the public policies and
practices of their agency and superiors. But dissent does not excuse
nonperformance of assigned duties. Personal grievances with little
implication for public policy are not protected speech. When
speech is protected, its suppression by a governmental employer is
sometimes affirmatively justifiable especially vis-a-vis confidential
and higher ranking servants. When defendants assert justification,
courts try the issue by balancing interests. Special cases of justifica-
tion are the Hatch Act and "Little Hatch Acts." Not justifiable are
patronage dismissals. A substantive liberty protected by the four-
teenth amendment is the freedom to seek employment and to be free
of serious defamation by a government employer which limits that
liberty.
Distinguished from constitutional substantive liberties to speak
and to seek employment are contractual or statutory rights to em-
ployment security sometimes called tenure or civil service status.
Tenure is a creature of local law.
When a public servant who does not have such locally created
rights of employment security, has been discharged and alleges that
the discharge was motivated by governmental or official opposition
to opinions expressed by her, after the fact she may assert her lost
income and status as consequences or damages to be remedied, but
the fourteenth amendment gives her no claim to prior hearing of
her grievances before discharge and no access to special tribunals
local law may have created for hearing grievances of tenured em-
ployees. The situtation is different for tenured public servants.
Nonprobationary employees in a civil service system or so called
tenured employees, will usually enjoy a right to prior hearing or to
expedited hearing after discharge. That is not because they have
more substantive rights of expression but because they are servants
of agencies who have promised them employment continuity, ab-
sent cause, and such contractual or statutory rights are deemed
property rights for purposes of the fourteenth amendment. For
such servants the question whether their expression is protected or
not by the first amendment will almost always also constitute a
question whether or not there will be cause in the absence of which
they, unlike servants at will and probationers, have a property right
to continued employment and income. It is the simultaneity of the
first amendment issues with the question of justification for forfei-
ture of "property" of the tenured servant that gives her a right of
prior or reasonably prompt post discharge hearing. For such a ser-
vant, a retaliatory discharge without expedited hearing is suppos-
edly a violation not only of the first amendment but also of the
fourteenth. This allows tenured servants to claim more damages for
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violation of rights of expression and gives them more procedural
safeguards of free expression than others have. This Article has ar-
gued that this result is good reason to pause and reconsider the wis-
dom of treating tenure or civil service status as property for
purposes of the fourteenth amendment.
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ADDENDUM
Digested below in chronological order are thirty-two cases which
are not cited in the text but which discuss tenure and free speech
(19 cases) of public servants and closely related points of practice
analyzed in the paper. Of the thirty-two cases, seven were decided
in 1984 and 20 in 1983. Taken along with the cases cited in the
text, these include all public employee first amendment cases de-
cided in 1983 and 1984 and printed in Federal Reports, 2d, and the
Supreme Court Reporter. The last volume searched was 747 F.2d
1584, December 24, 1984.
Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979) (Likelihood of
promotion, in a short time, to school principal from formal list of
eligibles, is not property protected by the due process clause. Also,
it is not liberty, at least not when the school board does not broad-
cast its reasons for changing its mind and passing over plaintiff for
another. Plaintiff had tentatively been selected when board found
he had once been arrested for theft but had been discharged without
trial when evidence against him was suppressed).
Fucik v. United States, 655 F.2d 1089, 228 Ct. Cl. 379 (1981)
(Amount and type of damages suffered by plaintiff may determine
subject matter jurisdiction of courts and other tribunals to hear the
case, but some tribunal should be provided. Dismissal of tenured
public servant without just cause and without procedural safe-
guards may be remedied under several forms because such measures
are unlawful in various senses. For example, they are "capricious"
in administrative law and reversible under the form of judicial re-
view of administrative action).
Dusanek v. Hannon, 677 F.2d 538 (7th Cir. 1982) (Independent
psychiatric examination scheduled with probable cause pursuant to
school board rule is more than "due" process to justify long term,
effectively involuntary leave without pay of a mentally ill tenured
teacher; also, lawful to dismiss teacher after long term leave expires
unless the teacher takes the initiative and either demands trial type
hearing or persuades board's medical director in non trial examina-
tions that he has obtained a cure).
Borrell v. USIA, 682 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (In 1978, Con-
gress created new boards to provide safeguards for non probation-
ers. Court finds that that act altered allocation of jurisdiction over
complaints by such employees but not over those of probationary
servants. Also found that Congress did not intend, and could not if
it wished to, abolish all causes for action of probationers for retalia-
tion for exercise of free speech. Absent any other forum, they may
sue in district court which has general jurisdiction over federal
questions).
[Vol. 21
50
California Western Law Review, Vol. 21 [1984], No. 1, Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol21/iss1/3
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Cutts v. Fowler, 692 F.2d 138 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Issues very simi-
lar to those in Borrell v. USIA, above).
Nilsen v. City of Moss Point, 701 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1983) (Joinder
of Title VII and § 1983 claims made compulsory).
Lyznicki v. Board of Education, 707 F.2d 949 (7th Cir. 1983) (Job
title and content said not to be property or liberty. Principal was
demoted to teacher without any hearing to contest cause but with-
out reduction in pay. First amendment aspects abandoned by plain-
tiff before appeal).
Gonzales v. Benavides, 712 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1983) (Early prog-
eny of Connick v. Myers).
Bell v. Sellevold, 713 F.2d 1396 (8th Cir. 1983) (Leasehold of
clinic building owned by county treated as property; summary evic-
tion under state forcible entry law found to fulfill requirement of
due process).
Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Finding the
substantive entitlements, intended by a legislature which created a
civil service personnel system, is difficult. A statutory list of per-
sonnel actions that may be taken only "for cause" is a valuable aid
to interpretation. Dicta that duty station and title and work con-
tent in the federal service are probably not property protected by
the fifth amendment. Point not decided because counsel did not
brief it. Judgment for defendant affirmed proforma. On facts, cus-
toms official was reassigned but not reduced in grade; later, his old
position was upgraded. Also, discussion of Borrell v. USIA and
Cutts v. Fowler).
Bueno v. City of Donna, 714 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1983) (Compensa-
tory damages measured the same way for due process as for free
speech violations; local procedural rights rejected as an indication
of substantive rights intended by drafters of local law).
Hughes v. Whitmer, 714 F.2d 1407 (8th Cir. 1983) (Transfer of
state policeman to a post 200 miles from his home found not to
constitute loss of liberty; interests in free speech balanced against
needs of state; discussion of when hearing to clear one's name
should be afforded).
Hadley v. County of Du Page, 715 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1983) (In-
nocent construction of allegedly stigmatizing words adopted by
court; opinion ruled that mere name clearing without money or
reinstatment is the remedy for deprivation of liberty to seek work).
Pollack v. Baxter Manor Nursing Home, 716 F.2d 545 (8th Cir.
1983) (Court awarded attorney fees in a case where only nominal
damages were due for denial of procedural due process).
Zeigler v. Jackson, 716 F.2d 847 (11th Cir. 1983) (Grievance
mechanisms and implied tenure were analyzed; review of medical
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data without trial type hearing found to constitute due process; dis-
cussion of due process for reapplying former employees).
Engelstad v. Virginia Municipal Hospital, 718 F.2d 262 (8th Cir.
1983) (Staff privileges at a city hospital deemed not to be property).
Mosrie v. Barry, 718 F.2d 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Loss of prereq-
uisites, prestige, and preferred duties, without loss of pay or formal
grade of captain in police force, adjudged not to be a loss of liberty
and status for constitutional purposes).
Crawford v. Gamier, 719 F.2d 1317 (7th Cir. 1983) (Pure first
amendment case by an untenured, low level, temporary public ser-
vant; the opinion identifies the interests protected by and damages
cognizable on account of a violation of the first amendment).
Carroll v. United States, 721 F.2d 155 (5th Cir. 1983) (Court
ruled that the only remedies for former United States government
employees for violation of their right of free speech are those pro-
vided by Civil Service rules).
Patteson v. Johnson, 721 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1983) (A recent exam-
ple of balancing the interests in free speech of a public servant
against the public need for confidential cooperation between high
officials and their principal deputies).
Loya v. Desert Sands Unified School District, 721 F.2d 279 (9th
Cir. 1983) (The opinion reaffirms that balancing of interests in a
free speech case is a task for the judge and not for the jury).
Loudermill v. Cleveland Board of Education, 721 F.2d 550 (6th
Cir. 1983) (Opinion rules that while full hearing before the fact is
not required, some form of preliminary hearing or procedure to as-
certain probable cause to discharge a tenured public servant is re-
quired by the constitution and that prompt, plenary, post discharge
hearing by itself is not due process; the opinion acknowledges con-
trary authority).
Shakman v. Democratic Organization of Cook County, 722 F.2d
1307 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 279 (1983) (Patronage
firing of a higher level, political appointee found not to violate a
prior decree and implicitly not to violate the first amendment).
Bowman v. Pulaski County Special School District, 723 F.2d 640
(8th Cir. 1983) (Transfers of outspoken teachers to unpreferred lo-
cations and duties found to be a violation of the first amendment
but not of the fourteenth; the remedy ordered was reasonably
prompt reassignment to duties and schools like the preferred assign-
ments but not necessarily to the exact initial posts).
Vasquez v. Van Lindt, 724 F.2d 321 (2nd Cir. 1983) (A state
court judgment on a point of federal constitutional law was resjudi-
cata and barred relitigation in federal court of a claim of denial of
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due process by a corrupt jockey whose license had been suspended
by the racing board).
Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Education, 104 S.
Ct. 892 (1984) (Supreme Court interpreted 28 U.S.C. § 1738, which
deals with resjudicata; preclusive effect in later federal court litiga-
tion of a prior state court judgment will be the same as the preclu-
sive effect state law gives to prior judgments of the state courts in
later state court proceedings).
Poorsina v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 726 F.2d 507 (9th
Cir. 1984) (Probationer M.D. fired for criticizing health care qual-
ity of Bureau of Indian Affairs clinic. Case distinguishes "statu-
tory" from "regulatory" substantive rights. Comes close to saying
that authority creating a substantive right is privileged to posit if
and how the right will be protected procedurally. Interplay be-
tween types of speech and subject matter jurisdiction. Different
types of speech claims to be referred to different administrative
tribunals for hearing. No express constitutional analysis. Partisan
political, political, and nonpolitical speech compared for jurisdic-
tional purposes).
McBee v. Jim Hogg County, 730 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1984) (en
blanc) (Interesting because the case involved, in a sense, free speech
about free speech; Ms. McBee criticized her superior for unfair pa-
tronage reprisal against other employees who had supported the su-
perior's opponent for election as sheriff. Reading Connick to limit
Elrod v. Burns, majority (12 judges) of entire court says even a pa-
tronage dismissal often can be justified by "balancing." Three
judges dissented).
Altman v. Hurst, 734 F.2d 1240 (7th Cir. 1984) (per curiam)
(Constructive demotion without pay reduction and assignment to
arduous duties (foot patrol and sentry duty in bad weather) not a
deprivation of property or liberty, but they are actionable damages
if inflicted in retaliation for free speech. As to latter, court finds
balance of interests entitles police chief defendant to judgment.
Opinion relies on Mathews v. Eldridge and Connick v. Myers).
Yoggerst v. Hedges, 739 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1984) (Case concerned
personal comment about agency head. Progeny of Connick v. My-
ers and its two stage test (first inquire if speech is protected vel non;
then balance interests if speech is protected.) Speech ruled unpro-
tected because it contained no matter of genuine public concern).
Manning v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 742 F.2d 1424 (Fed.
Cir. 1984) (Reassignment without demotion of employee who filed
grievances. Progeny of Bush v. Lucas. Regulations made jurisdic-
tion, of administrative tribunal, to hear first amendment claim, turn
on seriousness of adverse action).
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Williams v. IRS, 745 F.2d 702 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Per curiam opin-
ion vacated and remanded for fuller record. First amendment
rights of association and free exercise of religion asserted in a dense
thicket of federal procedural law enacted in 1978 for the federal
civil service. Discusses Borrell v. USIA, Cutts v. Fowler, and Car-
ducci v. Regan. Federal civil service-first amendment cases look
like a growth sector of the mid-1980's).
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